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ABSTRACT
This paper examines empirically whether sophisticated speculative short
sellers can detect earnings management by targeting stocks with large income- increasing
discretionary accruals and high total accruals. Prior research indicates that total accruals
are overpriced and this overpricing is largely attributable to the mispricing of
discretionary accruals. Recent studies show that neither auditors nor financial analysts
utilize information in accruals. Using samples of 11,537 firm-quarter observations and
5,118 firm-year observations for 1,146 12/31 non- financial NYSE firms from 1992 to
1999, I find supporting evidence those speculative short sellers can detect earnings
management using financial accounting information disclosed in 10-Q and 10-K report.
Specifically, I identify a significant and positive association between relative short
interest and quarterly accruals. When I decompose accruals into its discretionary and
non-discretionary components, I find that quarterly discretionary accruals are positively
and significantly related to relative short interest. I further divide quarterly data into four
sub-samples of separate fiscal quarters and find that speculative short sellers detect
earnings management especially in the third and fourth quarters of a fiscal year and trade
consistent with the information provided in quarterly accruals. In addition, the empirical
results indicate that speculative short sellers establish short positions in firms with high
accruals and large income- increasing discretionary accruals estimated using annual
financial accounting information.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines whether sophisticated short sellers can detect earnings
management and thus target stocks with large income- increasing discretionary
accruals and high total accruals.

Earnings management has drawn increasing

attention of regulators, accounting standard setters, and investors.

In 1998, the

Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Arthur Levitt argued
that earnings management practice masked the underlying performance of the firm
and advocated increasing the quality of the reported earnings. In December 1999, the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) strengthened the rules for audit committee by
requiring all listed firms to have an audit committee consisting of at least three
independent directors, among whom at least one committee member has accounting
or financial management expertise. Accounting frauds and corporate scandals at
Enron and WorldCom make a campaign against earnings management imminent. In
2002, the U.S. congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to improve the accuracy and
reliability of corporate financial reporting and disclosures.
Prior accounting research has explored earnings management incentives
from three perspectives: (1) capital market expectations and valuations (e.g. Sloan
1996; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998ab; Erickson and Wang 1999; Xie 2001); (2)
contracting motivations (e.g. Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1988; DeFond and Jiambalvo
1994); and (3) industry regulation and other regulations (e.g. Petroni 1992). This
study focuses on the first motivation by examining whether the speculative short
sellers can detect earnings management and anticipate capital market consequences.
Short sellers engage in short selling by borrowing a security from a broker and selling
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it with a promise to return it at a later date. They earn a profit from the decline in a
security’s price. Furthermore, they are highly motivated to detect income- increasing
earnings management because they can profit directly from the overpricing of
discretionary accruals.
Previous research has provided conflicting evidence on whether investors
can detect earnings management. Some studies have shown that investors appear
able to see through earnings management in the banking and insurance industry (e.g.
Petroni 1992; Wahlen 1994; Petroni, et al. 1997; Penalva 1998). In contrast, several
recent studies have shown that investors may not fully detect earnings management.
Specifically, Sloan (1996) documents that the market overprices total accruals. He
finds that firms with high accruals experience large negative earnings reversals and
significantly lower returns in the subsequent year.

Collins and Hribar (2000a)

provide additional evidence of the accrual anomaly using quarterly data. They find
that the accrual (cash flow) compone nt of earnings appears to be overpriced
(underpriced) because the persistence of the accrual (cash flow) component of
earnings is overestimated (underestimated).

Xie (2001) further investigates the

market pricing of accruals by dividing total accruals into two components: normal
and discretionary accruals.

His findings suggest that discretionary accruals are

overpriced and the overpricing of total accruals documented in Sloan (1996) is largely
attributable to the mispricing of discretionary accruals.

Chambers (1999)

demonstrates that investors who cannot identify the managed portion of reported
earnings are likely to overvalue firms with income- increasing earnings management
and undervalue firms with income-decreasing earnings management. Other studies
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provide additional empirical evidence of mispricing associated with opportunistic
earnings management (e.g. Vargus and Beneish 2001; Barth and Hutton 2001;
DeFond and Park 2001).
Two recent studies (Teoh and Wong 1999; Bradshaw, et al. 2001) present
evidence that neither sell-side financial analysts nor independent auditors provide
investors with information on the future earnings implications of firms with high
accruals. Teoh and Wong (1999) find that the earnings forecast errors persist up to
four years after the new equity issuance. They show that forecast errors can be
explained largely by the discretionary accruals in the issuing year. Richardson (2003)
finds no systematic evidence that short sellers anticipate lower future returns on the
stocks with high total accruals using the accounting information disclosed in the
annual report.
This paper investigates whether the speculative short sellers can detect
earnings management by using quarterly (annual) accounting data and monthly short
interest 1 data from 1992 to 1999. Speculative short sellers have strong incentives to
detect earnings management because they can greatly benefit from lower future
returns on firms that engage in income- increasing earnings management.

Staley

(1997) describes how fundamental analysis is practiced on Wall Street and illustrates
that short sellers employ fundamental analysis to identify overvalued securities. This
paper is distinguished from prior studies by examining the association between
directional earnings management as proxied by discretionary accruals and speculative
short selling activity. Unlike prior research examining on short selling activity as a
whole, this paper distinguishes speculative short selling from other short selling
1

Short interest refers to the number of shares that have been sold short.
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activities motivated by arbitrage and hedging purposes and focuses on speculative
short selling only. In addition, this study employs a different research design and
dataset than those used in prior research. The results indicate that speculative short
sellers establish short positio ns in stocks with high quarterly total accruals. More
importantly, the results also suggest that speculative short sellers can distinguish
discretionary accruals from normal accruals and target stocks that have large incomeincreasing discretionary accrua ls, especially in the third and the fourth quarters of the
fiscal year.
I further use annual data to examine the relation between speculative short
selling and accruals (discretionary accruals). The results indicate that speculative
short sellers use accruals information disclosed in the 10-K report and target stocks
with high total accruals and large income-increasing discretionary accruals. This
paper contributes to the accounting literature on earnings management by providing
empirical evidence that sophisticated speculative short sellers can detect earnings
management. This paper also provides further insight into how short sellers
incorporate financial accounting information into their trading strategies.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the
prior literature on short selling and earnings management. Section 3 presents the
hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the sample selection and descriptive statistics of the
data.

The research design and model specification are presented in Section 5.

Empirical results are illustrated in Section 6. Section 7 reports the results of the
sensitivity analysis and concluding remarks are presented in Section 8.
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2. SUMMARY OF PRIOR LITERATURE ON SHORT SELLING AND
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
2.1 Prior Research on Short Selling
A short sale refers to a sale of a security that a seller does not own or owns
but sells without an intention to deliver. To effectively sell a security, a short seller
borrows the security from other sources such as institutional investors and brokerdealers. The short seller covers the short position by returning the security to the
lender at a later time. Short sellers engage in short selling activity to profit from the
expected decrease in the security price or to hedge the risk of a long position in the
same underlying security or in another security whose value is linked with the
underlying security. Short sellers can also short sell against the box to defer capital
gains tax to a later year before Tax Payer Relief Act of 1997. I refer to short sellers
who do not trade for hedging, arbitrage, or tax purpose but only to gain from the
anticipated downward movement of the security price as “speculative short sellers”.
The maximum gain on a short position is the sales proceeds when the
security price decreases to zero. However, the potential downside risk on a short
position may be theoretically infinite.

Short selling is prohibited in many foreign

stock markets due to the high risk involved in the short selling activity. Additionally,
short sale could drive the security price down substantially. Meeker (1932) argues
that the stock market crash in 1929 may have been exacerbated by short sales.
Consequently, U.S. regulators have established strict rules to mo nitor short selling
activities due to this special risk-return profile. In 1934, the Congress enacted the
Securities and Exchange Act which included restrictions on short selling. Section
10(a) of the Exchange Act grants the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC)
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authority to regulate short sales of securities registered on a national securities
exchange. Under Rule 10a-1, subject to certain exceptions, short sales of a listed
security can only be accomplished on a “plus tick” or a “zero plus tick” basis. The
“plus tick” refers to short selling at a price above the price of an effective sale
immediately prior to the short sale. A “zero tick” refers to a short sale at the last sale
price if it is higher than the last difference price. It follows that a short seller cannot
sell short unless the selling price is higher than the last sales price or the selling price
is the same as the last sales price if the most recent price was moving upward. Both
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
have adopted this tick test for a short sale. The tick test reflects the SEC’s concern of
the adverse effect of short sales in a downward moving market. The SEC adopted the
“up-tick” rule in order to allow relatively unrestricted short selling in an upward
moving market and to prevent the use of short selling as a means of driving the
market down.
Rule 10a-1 only applies to short selling of securities listed or traded on an
exchange. In 1986, National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) proposed the
adoption of similar short sales restriction covering NASDAQ National Market
System (NMS) securities. In 1994, the SEC approved NASD’s rule. Under the
NASD short sale rule (Rule 3350), NASD members cannot sell short NMS securities
at or below the current best (inside) bid when that bid is lower than the previous best
(inside) bid. This is also known as the “bid test”. McCormick and Reilly (1996)
examine the economic impact of the Nasdaq short sale rule and find that the rule is
effective in restricting short selling at the inside bid over the period of large security
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price downward movement without decreasing the market quality.

They conclude

that the objective of the NASDAQ short sale rule has been achieved.
On August 25, 1988, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-21, which is designed to
mitigate price manipulation by short sellers around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).
Short sellers may establish short positions prior to SEOs and cover their short
positions by purchasing the shares at the fixed offering price, which makes the
underlying equity subject to price manipulation and short selling less risky.
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) examine the short selling activity prior to SEOs and
find that before SEC Rule 10b-21, short interest measured between the announcement
date of SEOs and the offer date is three times the short interest accumulated over the
period of three months before the announcement. In addition, short selling activity
returns to its normal level following the offer date. The increase in short selling
activity is related to the large equity issuance discount. However, the levels of short
interest over the period from the issuance announcement date to the offer date
decreases significantly following the adoption of Rule 10b-21. They also find that the
issuance discounts are smaller after Rule 10b-21 adoption when compared to
discounts observed prior to its adoption. Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996)’s findings
suggest that Rule 10b-21 restricted the short selling activity prior to the SEOs and
lowered the issuance discount.
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) developed a theoretical framework for
short selling constraints and predicted on the impact of these constraints on price
adjustment to private information. They theorized that there are two types of short
selling costs: short prohibition costs and short restriction costs.
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First, short

prohibition costs prevent investors who want to sell short from short selling. Some
institutional investors and corporate insiders are prevented from short selling by
regulations or terms in the contracts. The Investment Company Act of 1940 prohibits
investment companies from engaging in short selling activities except under special
circumstances.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) forbids

short selling by pension funds.

Some special accounts such as retirement and

custodial accounts are prohibited from short sales as well. In addition, the uptick rule
prohibits short selling at prices lower than the last differing price.
Second, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) define short restriction costs as
those additional costs imposed on short sellers.

These costs include the non

availability of sales proceeds to short sellers and the low interest that may accrue on
these proceeds. Short sellers do not obtain sales proceeds. The sales proceeds are
retained as collateral for the owner of the borrowed securities. Typically, small short
sellers do not receive any interest on the retained sales proceeds although large short
sellers may.

Geczy, et al. (2002) examines the equity lending market and short

selling, and illustrate that an equity loan is a temporary exchange of ownership. The
lender transfers legal ownership of some shares to the borrower. At the same time the
borrower transfers collateral, which is usually in the form of cash and typically 102%
of equity value. In the loan contract, a rebate rate represents the interest on the
collateral that the lender rebates to the borrower, and is determined by negotiation
between the lender and the borrower. From the equity borrower’s perspective, the
rebate rate is essentially the interest on his/her loan. In the case of short selling, a
broker acts as an intermediary of an equity loan. If an institutional investor has been
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identified as the equity lender, the institution has to pay interest to the broker on the
sales proceeds. The broker profits from the spread between the interest rebate paid to
the short seller and the interest collected from the equity lender. The level of interest
rate depends on the broker’s difficulty in locating the shares to be borrowed. Equities
that are easy and inexpensive to borrow have a high rebate rate.

D’Avolio (2001)

and Reed (2001) document that the borrowing cost for a large portion of stocks they
analyzed is low and that the rebate rate follows the overnight Fed Fund rate very
closely. Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) document that the rebate rate is usually the
Fed Funds rate minus 0.25% for the most easily borrowed shares. On the contrary,
the rebate rate for stocks that are expensive to borrow is low or even negative.
Stocks with low or negative rebate rate are “on special” or “hot”. A negative rebate
rate is essentially a premium. That is, the equity borrowers are obligated to pay a
premium to the lender for the right to borrow, instead of receiving any interest on the
collateral from the lender. In the case of short sale, short selling becomes very costly
if the stocks are on special. If the borrowed equities are from a retail margined
account instead of an institutional investor, the owners of the stock do not obtain
either the sales proceeds or interest because they are not informed that their stocks
have been lent.
The Federal Reserve established Regulation T, which requires that short
sellers deposit 50% of the market value of the securities that have been sold short. A
short seller may face a margin call and be obligated to add more funds into his/her
margin account if the price of the shorted stock increases.

The NYSE requires a

minimum maintenance margin of 30% of the greater of the current market value of
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the security or $5 per share. The margin deposit may take the form of interestbearing treasury securities.
Furthermore, short sellers are required to reimburse the security owner for
any subsequent dividend declared over the period when the short position is open.
Frank and Jagannathan (1998) document that the price of the ex-dividend stock is
typically higher than the price of the pre-dividend share less the dividend.
Short sellers borrow securities from other investors. The equity lending
market increases the risk of the short sellers by exposing them to “short squeezes”.
The security loans are “demand loans,” that is, the owner of the borrowed security
can sell the security at any time. If this occurs, short sellers must close the short
position accordingly.

A short squeeze occurs when alternative lenders are not

available and the short sellers must purchase the security in the open market to cover
the short position. Short sellers may identify the owners of the borrowed shares to
reduce the risk of a short squeeze. The brokers may reveal the identity of the lender
to large short sellers such that short sellers may use this information to assess the
probability of a short squeeze. Short sellers are less likely to face a short squeeze for
stocks with high institutional ownership because a substitute for the stock lender can
be easily found.
The costs and risks of short selling discussed above suggest that short sales
are much more costly than establishing a long position in a security. Diamond and
Verrecchia (1987) propose that short sellers are more likely to be informed because
rational investors engage in short selling only if the benefit generated from a short
sale outweighs the cost incurred.

In other words, short sellers expect the security
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price to decrease to the extent that it is sufficient to compensate them for the risks and
costs they bear. In their analytical model, informed traders have private information
and know the true liquidation value of the underlying risky security, whereas
uninformed traders infer the value of the security based on all public information.
Their model predicts that the costs of short selling affects the composition of the
informed versus uninformed traders in the pool of the short sellers.
Short selling literature is dominated by the view that short interest is a
bearish indicator. Hana (1976) argues that short interest is a bullish indicator because
it implies a future demand for the underlying security. However, numerous more
recent studies suggest that short interest conveys bearish information content.
Figlewski (1981) proposes that the actual volume of short selling provides an
indication of the extent of adverse belief about the value of stock in the market. His
result indicates that lower short interest portfolios experience substantially higher
realized returns than the high short interest portfolios counterpart. In other words,
excess returns seem to be negatively correlated with short interest, which is a proxy
of negative information. However, with the constraint of obtaining proceeds of a short
sale, neither the short portfolio nor the arbitrage portfolio produced excess profits.
Other studies fail to identify a strong systematic relation between short interest and
equity returns (Brent, Morse and Stice 1990; Woolridge and Dickinson 1994;
Figlewski and Webb 1993). Senchack and Starks (1993) document that stocks with
unexpected increases in short interest experience significantly negative abnormal
returns for a brief period surrounding the short interest announcement date.
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Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) use on a sample of firms that have high
level of relative short interest (e.g. short interest as a percentage of the number of
shares outstanding is no less than 2.5%). They argue that the process of random
sample selection leads to an inability to observe a strong or consistent relationship
between short interest and excess return. This is because the random sample used in
the previous research includes a large portion of firms that do not have short interest
or have a very small percentage of short interest in a given month. They find a strong
negative relationship between short interest and subsequent stock returns, both during
the time the stocks are heavily shorted and in the subsequent two years. Abnormal
returns are even more highly negative for firms that are heavily shorted for more than
one month. This result is consistent with the view that short interests convey negative
information.
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) develop a theoretical model of short
selling. In their analytical framework, short sellers are more likely to be informed
traders because short selling is very costly. Their model predicts that increasing the
cost of short selling drives relatively more uninformed traders out of the pool of short
sellers because only informed traders are willing to bear the high cost in order to
realize anticipated benefits. Reed (2002) provides supporting evidence of Diamond
and Verrecchia’s prediction that short sales’ constraints reduce the speed at which the
prices adjust to private information. Arnold, et al. (2002) present supporting evidence
of the proposition of the extended Diamond and Verrecchia model by documenting
the information content of the short interest increases after Tax Payers’ Relief Act of
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1997 which eliminates the tax loop hole of the “short sale against box”2 . Recent
empirical research on short selling provides additional supporting evidence that short
interest is a strong bearish signal. Aitken, et al. (1998) show that short sales are
instantaneous bad news by examining the intra-day price reaction to the information
on short interest of stocks traded on the Australian Stock Exchange. Dechow et al.
(2001) illustrate that short sellers utilize information in the fundamental ratios by
targeting stocks with low ratios of earnings to the market value (book value to the
market value) because these firms have lower future returns. Desai et al. (2002)
provide additional evidence that heavily shorted NASDAQ firms experience
significant negative abnormal returns ranging from –0.76% to –1.13% per month. The
positive relation between the negative return and the level of short interest indicates
that a high level of short interest is a strong bearish signal.

They also show that

heavily shorted firms experience a higher probability of being delisted.
2.2 Prior Research on Earnings Management
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as follows:
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers…
Extant accounting literature on earnings management focuses on trying to
answer two questions: (1) Does earnings management exist? (2) Why do managers
engage in earnings management? The typical approach is to identify the managerial

2

Short sale against the box refers to an transaction in which an investor holds a long position in a security
sells the same security short.
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incentive structure to manage earnings and examine whether the unexpected
accounting accruals or accounting method choices are consistent with these incentive
mechanisms.

Accounting researchers examine the motivation for earnings

management from three perspectives: (1) capital market expectations and firm
valuations; (2) contracts based on the accounting numbers; (3) regulation (Healy and
Wahlen 1999). This paper focuses on the first motivation, that is, equity market
motivated earnings management.
Value-relevance capital market research documents that accounting
information such as earnings has information content.

Investors make their

investment decisions using firm-specific accounting information. Market reaction to
unexpected earnings is reflected in a significant price movement and a change in
trading volume (e.g. Ball and Brown 1968; Beaver 1968; Bamber 1986; Bamber
1987). Investors use firm-specific accounting information in equity valuation and
optimize their investment portfolio accordingly.

This creates an incentive for

managers to engage in earnings management to affect the equity pricing. Similarly,
financial analysts are a large group of professionals that use accounting information
extensively. It is well documented in the financial analyst forecast literature that
analyst forecasts outperform time-series models as surrogates for market expectations
of earnings (Brown and Rozeff 1978; Fried and Givoly 1982) because of timeliness
and the rich information set of financial analysts. Accounting information is a large
component of the information set of financial analysts. The incorporation of the
accounting information in analysts’ forecasts creates managerial incentives to manage
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earnings to affect the market expectation of earnings and thus have impact on stock
price.
Dye (1988) theorizes the demand for earnings management from two
perspectives: internal demand and external demand. He posits that the external
demand for earnings management is driven by the existing shareholders’ attempts to
change prospective investors’ valuations of the firm. Trueman and Titman (1988)
provide an explanation of earnings smoothing as managerial incentive to reduce the
claimholders’ perception of the volatility of the economic earnings of the firm and
affect their investment decisions accordingly.
Many studies explore the capital market incentive for managers to engage in
earnings smoothing by examining unexpected accounting accruals in specific
transactions in which managers are highly motivated to manage earnings.
Management buyouts (MBO) may motivate managers to manipulate earnings
downward prior to the buyout. The empirical evidence on earnings management prior
to management buyouts is mixed. DeAngelo (1986) examines the accrual changes of
buyout firms and the result does not support the earnings management hypothesis. In
contrast, Perry and Williams (1994) document significant income-decreasing
unexpected accruals before MBOs. Wu (1997) examines 87 MBO cases over the
period of 1980-1987 and provides supporting evidence that managers manipulate
earnings downward prior to the MBO proposal. He reports a systematic relationship
between the stock price decline in the pre-MBO period and pre-MBO earnings
changes.

He also shows that the estimated benefit from downward earnings

manipulation of the sample firms is about $50 million. Marquardt and Wiedman
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(2003) use the performance- matched approach developed by Kothari, et al. (2001) to
estimate the unexpected component of accounts receivable, inventory, accrued
liabilities, depreciation expenses, and special items. They find unexpected negative
accounts receivable for a sample of MBOs.
Erickson and Wang (1999) examine earnings management around stock
mergers using a sample of acquiring firms. They find that acquiring firms manipulate
earnings upward in the quarter prior to a stock merger and conclude that the result is
consistent with the notion that acquiring firms engage in income- increasing earnings
management to boost their prices before a stock merger. Their study also shows that
discretionary accruals are positively associated with the economic benefit to the
acquiring firm measured as the relative size of the deal (deal value scaled by the
market value of the acquiring firm).
Several studies examine earnings management in the context of equity
offerings. Managers are highly motivated to engage in income- increasing earnings
management to boost stock prices. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) examine the
relationship between earnings management measured by discretionary accruals and
the long-run underperformance of Initial Public Offering (henceforth, IPO) firms
documented in Loughran and Ritter (1995).

They find that large discretionary

accruals are significantly and negatively related to abnormal stock returns following
the equity offerings. They document that a hedge portfolio consisting of a long
position in the firms with low discretionary accruals and a short position in firms with
high discretionary accruals yields a mean excess return of 102% in the three- year
period right after the first fiscal year end. In addition, Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998)
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provide empirical evidence that IPO firms use discretionary accruals to influence
investor perceptions and the valuation of the firm. Specifically, they show that firms
with high levels of discretionary working capital and total accruals in the year when
the firm goes public have lower future cash flows. Their findings indicate that net
income and cash flows from operations increase in the fiscal year prior to the IPO and
decrease in the year of the IPO.
Other studies provide empirical evidence of earnings management around
seasoned equity offerings (henceforth SEO). Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b) report
that issuing firms engage in earnings management via significant income- increasing
discretionary accruals prior to the SEO. These firms experience subsequent poor
stock price performance and lower net income.

They find that the negative

relationship between discretionary accruals and stock returns is stronger for SEO
firms than for non- issuing firms. Their result suggests that earning management
provides some explanation for the underperformance of firms after SEOs that was
documented in Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). They conclude that investors do
not see through earnings management prior to the SEO and fail to discount the
managerial manipulations of reported earnings prior to SEOs.
Rangan (1998) conducts a similar study by examining whether the earnings
management around SEOs explains the underperformance of SEOs and finds that
both earning changes and market-adjusted stock returns are significantly and
negatively related to discretionary accruals prior to the offering. His result indicates
that SEO firms are overvalued by the capital market and experience a significant
decline in earnings driven by earnings management around the offering. Shivakumar
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(2000) draws a different conclusion from the investigation of earnings management
around SEOs. He also finds evidence of earnings management prior to the equity
offerings; however, he argues that the objective of earnings management prior to the
SEO is not to misguide investors but rather to respond rationally to the expected
trading in the market at the equity-offering announcement. Investors pool all issuing
firms together as firms overstating their earnings and discount firm value accordingly
because firms cannot credibly convey information of the absence of earnings
management to the capital market. It follows tha t the issuing firms respond to the
expected market behavior by managing earnings upward prior to SEO. He shows that
earnings management of the issuing firm is a unique Nash equilibrium. He also
shows that the significant negative relation between discretionary accruals prior to
SEO and the subsequent future stock return performance documented in both Rangan
(1998) and Teoh, et al. (1998b) are not robust to their relatively well- specified
research methodologies.

He reports that the investors’ trading response to the

unexpected earnings is significantly weaker in the period subsequent to the
announcement of SEOs, suggesting that market participants perceive earnings
management through the equity-offering announcement.

He also shows that

discretionary accruals prior to the SEOs are significantly related to the two-day
negative stock price reaction subsequent to the equity issuance announcement. He
argues that this relationship implies that investors discount the income- increasing
earning manipulation at the issuance announcement.
The accrual anomaly is well documented in accounting literature. Sloan
(1996) documents that the accrual component of earnings is overpriced. He examines
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whether the information implications about future earnings reflected by the cash flow
and accrual components of current earnings are impounded into the equity valuation
in a timely manner in the capital market.

Bernard and Stober (1989) conclude that

there is no systematic difference between the information content of cash flows and
accruals. In contrast, Sloan (1996) documents that the information content of the
cash flow component of earnings is different from the information content of the
accrual component of earnings. He shows that the persistence of current earnings is
positively related to the magnitude of the cash flow component of current earnings
and negatively related to the magnitude of the accrual component of current earnings.
Furthermore, he shows that the implications for future earnings reflected by the
current earnings are not fully incorporated into the stock price. He classifies his
sample firms into ten deciles based on the ranking of accruals. He shows that a hedge
portfolio consisting of a long position in stocks in the lowest deciles of accruals and a
short position in stocks in the highest deciles of accruals experience significant
positive size-adjusted abnormal returns of 10.4% in the first year, 4.8% in the second
year and 3.8% in the third year. He also reports that the lower (higher) future retur ns
of stocks with higher (lower) levels of accruals concentrates around earnings
announcements in the future.
Xie (2001) extends the Sloan’s (1996) study by examining whether the
discretionary component of accruals is mispriced. He follows DeFond and Jiambalvo
(1994) and Subramanyam (1996) and estimates discretionary accruals using the crosssectional Jones (1991) model. The result indicates that the market overestimates the
persistence of the discretionary component of accruals and thus overprices

19

discretionary accruals. Moreover, he shows that the overpricing of discretionary
accruals is more severe than overpricing of normal accruals.

He conducts two tests

in his study. First, the result from the Mishikin (1983) test provides evidence that the
valuation coefficient on discretionary accruals is significantly larger than the
forecasting coefficient of discretionary accruals, suggesting the overvaluation of the
discretionary accruals by the capital market. The overpricing of normal accruals is
less severe than the discretionary accruals counterpart. Second, the hedge portfolio
test indicates that hedge portfolio going long in the lowest deciles of discretionary
accruals and going short in the highest deciles of discretionary accruals generates
significantly positive abnormal returns in subsequent years. This result suggests that
discretionary accruals are overvalued in the year that the hedge portfolio is formed.
The hedge portfolio test does not provide any evidence of the overvaluation of normal
accruals. He concludes that the mispricing of total accruals documented in Sloan
(1996) is driven primarily by the overpricing of discretionary accruals. His findings
also extend Subramanyam (1996)’s study by providing empirical evidence that the
market not only prices discretionary accruals but also overprices discretionary
accruals.
DeFond and Park (2001) further examine the role of accounting accruals in
stock valuation. They provide evidence that the market does not fully adjust for the
future reversal of discretionary accruals at the earnings announcement date.
Specifically, their result shows that firms with both good news and incomedecreasing discretionary accruals experience significantly higher cumulative
abnormal returns than firms with both good news and income- increasing
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discretionary accruals over the period of 80 days after the earnings announcement.
The result also indicates that firms with both bad news and income-decreasing
discretionary accruals have significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns than
firms with both bad news and income- increasing discretionary accruals over the same
time periods. Their study attributes the overpricing of discretionary accruals to the
market’s under-expectation of the future reversal of discretionary working capital
accruals. This is consistent with Xie’s (2001) conclusion that the overpricing of
discretionary accruals is driven by the overestimation of the persistence of
discretionary accruals.
Collins and Hribar (2000) extend Sloan’s (1996) study by empirically
examining whether the accrual anomaly on an annual basis holds on a quarterly basis
and whether the accrual anomaly is different from post-earnings announcement drift.
Post-earnings announcement drift is a well-documented market anomaly under the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Stock prices tend to drift upward for positive
quarterly earnings surprises and downward for negative quarterly earnings surprise in
the post-earning announcement period. Bernard and Thomas (1989) document that a
hedge portfolio formed by taking a long position in stocks in the highest unexpected
earnings deciles and a short position in stocks in the lowest unexpected deciles
generates an estimated abnormal return of approximately 4.2% for 60 days
subsequent to the earnings announcement. The annualized abnormal return resulting
from the drift is 18%. Ball and Bartov (1996) document that investors systematically
underestimate the magnitude of serial correlation of the earnings surprise and respond
to the portion of earnings surprises that have been predictable based on the time-
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series of earnings in the past at the subsequent earnings announcement. It follows
that stock prices fail to incorporate the information of current quarterly earnings for
future earnings.

Collins and Hribar (2000) examine the accrual anomaly using

quarterly earnings data to compare the accrual-based anomaly with the earningsbased anomaly. They find that the market overestimates the persistence of the accrual
component of quarterly earnings and thus systematically overprices accruals. Their
result shows that accrual mispricing is distinct from the post-earnings announcement
drift anomaly. They also show that a trading strategy that uses both an earningsbased anomaly and an accrual-based anomaly generates larger abnormal returns than
those that can be generated using a trading strategy that takes advantage of each
individual anomaly only.

Specifically, a trading strategy that takes a long (short)

position in stocks with extreme positive unexpected earnings and extreme negative
(positive) accruals generates abnormal returns which almost doubles the abnormal
returns generated by trading on each anomaly only over the following two quarters.
Chambers (1999) documents significant market mispricing related to
earnings management. He argues that accounting earnings provide value-relevant
information for investors to make investment portfolio choices and emphasizes that
the extent of persistence of accounting earnings affects investors’ stock valuations.
He posits that opportunistic earnings management makes earnings fail to reflect the
persistence of economic performance of the underlying firm and the real earnings
generating capacity of a firm. He demonstrates that investors who cannot identify the
managed portion of reported earnings are likely to overvalue firms with incomeincreasing earnings management and undervalue firms with income-decreasing
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earnings management because the extent of persistence of overall earnings will be
either overestimated or underestimated. He uses discretionary accruals as a proxy for
earnings management.

The result suggests that firms that engage in earnings

management are temporarily mispriced in the market and invested capital is
misallocated.
The mispricing of the accrual component of earnings and the discretionary
component of accruals from the empirical studies discussed above suggests that
investors do not see through earnings management. Investors fail to discount the
earnings with high accruals. Firms with high accruals are likely to have lower future
returns. Recent studies investigate whether extensive accounting information users
can detect earnings management.

Financial analysts are a large group of

professionals that use accounting information intensively. They play an important
role as an information intermediary.

They expend resources in information

acquisition and processing and provide information about securities to investors to
facilitate their investment decisions.

Teoh and Wong (1999) examine whether

financial analysts can detect earnings management by investigating whether financial
analysts incorporate the predictable future earnings decline for firms with high
accruals into their forecast. They find that discretionary accruals in the equity issue
year significantly explain analyst annual earnings forecast errors up to four years after
the new issue. They further categorize analysts into affiliated and unaffiliated groups
and find that both groups are credulous about discretionary accruals. They conclude
that financial analysts do not see through earnings management using discretionary
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accruals and their biased assessments of issuers’ accruals leads to overoptimism in the
equity issuance.
Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001) examine two information
intermediaries to see whether they can provide information about the subsequent
earnings problem associated with high accruals in current earnings.

First, they

examine the forecast behavior of sell-side financial analysts and find that their
forecast errors are large and negative for firms with high level of accruals. This is
consistent with the notion that analysts do not anticipate future earnings decreases for
high accrual firms.

They provide two possible explanations for their result: (1)

analysts lack sophistication and skills to fully understand the information content of
current earnings with high accruals; and (2) sell- side analysts collude with
management to inflate future earnings expectations. Their explanations are consistent
with other studies that report that management engages in earnings manipulation
through discretionary accruals to boost stock prices around some corporate events
such as SEO. Second, they analyze auditor behavior by examining the audit opinion
and auditor turnover for firms with high accruals.

They show that firms with

unusually high accruals are more likely to experience decreases in future earnings and
SEC enforcement actions for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
violations. However, they do not find supporting evidence that auditors provide an
early warning to investors regarding the subsequent earnings decline and the
increased probability of GAAP violation for these high accrual firms.

There is

neither an increase in the frequency of modified auditor opinion nor an increase in the
auditor turnover rate. They conclude that neither the sell-side financial analysts nor
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the independent auditors provide investors with information on the future earnings
implications of firms with high accruals.
Richardson (2003) investigates overall short selling activities motivated by
various reasons and finds no systematic evidence that short sellers anticipate lower
future returns on the stocks with high total accruals based on the accounting
information disclosed in the annual report. Specifically, he examines a sample of
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms over the period from 1980 to 1998 and finds
high accruals firms experience subsequent lower returns. However, his result shows
that short sellers trade in both high accruals firms and low accruals firms.

He

concludes that short sellers do not take the opportunity of earning one-year ahead 8%
abnormal returns by switching from going short in low accrual firms to going short in
high accrual firms. Further analysis shows that short sellers trade actively in glamour
stocks but fail to see through the future earnings problems of high accrual firms.
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
Short selling allows short sellers to profit from a decrease in a security’s
price by selling an asset he (she) does not own and purchasing it at a lower price later
to cover the short position. In this study, I investigate whether a sophisticated group
of investors, speculative short sellers, can detect earnings management.

Prior

literature in short selling provides evidence that short sellers are sophisticated
investors.

They succeed at identifying mispriced stocks using their knowledge,

information, and talents. Among all short sellers, speculative short sellers are highly
motivated to detect earnings management because they can profit from current
earnings’ implication of lower future returns for firms with high total accruals and
large income- increasing discretionary accruals. Firms with high total accruals are
likely to experience lower future returns (Sloan 1996). In addition, firms that engage
in earnings management through large income-increasing discretionary accruals are
likely to be overvalued by the market and thus experience lower future returns (Xie
2001). Speculative short sellers go short in overpriced stocks with high total accruals
or large income- increasing discretionary accruals and cover their short positions when
the stock price subsequently drops. In this study, I focus on the trading activities of
speculative short sellers to examine whether they can detect earnings management.
The motivation for short selling activity can be viewed from three
perspectives. First and foremost, short sellers engage in short selling activity for
speculative purposes. In other words, investors who short sell for speculative purpose
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expect to profit from a decline in the security price.

A survey conducted in 1947

reports that two-thirds of total short selling is motivated by speculation.
Second, short selling may be an essential component of hedging and
arbitrage strategies. Investors may earn an arbitrage profit by taking a relevant
position in an additional security that is connected to the value of the underlying
stock. These additional securities include an option on the underlying stock, a
convertible bond or convertible preferred stock, stock index futures, and other
financial instruments whose value is linked to the market price of the underlying
stock. McDonald and Baron (1973) document that arbitrage and hedging play an
important role in explaining short selling activity. They argue that stocks with a
higher return volatility have a higher level of short interest because hedging can
motivate short sales. Their empirical analysis shows that short interest is positively
related to beta.
Option trading has two opposite effects on short interest. Investors with
unfavorable information on a security and who are either prohibited from short selling
or prefer not to sell short for various reasons, may switch to purchasing a put option
on the security. It follows that there could be a substitution effect between taking a
long position in a put option and going short. However, the option market makers
may increase their short positions in the underlying secur ity to hedge their position.
Thus, short interest increases with the introduction of the traded options on the
underlying security.

Figlewski and Webb (1993) present evidence that options

facilitate short selling and enhance information efficiency of the market. They find
that stocks with traded options have higher average levels of short interest than stocks
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without traded options. They also show that short selling activity for an individual
stock increases after option listing.

Options improve transaction efficiency by

providing investors who are constrained to sell short an opportunity to purchase a put
option or write a call option as an alternative to sell short the security directly. In
addition, options enhance the information efficiency of the market because that short
sale restriction makes unfavorable information under-represented in the stock price in
the market. Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) find that firms with large short positions
are likely to be firms with listed options. They document that a group of heavily
shorted firms have a higher portion of traded call options than a group of randomly
selected firms.
Risk arbitrage literature indicates that short selling can be related to merger
activity.

Specifically, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and Cornelli and Li (2002)

document that short selling is a part of the investment strategy of risk arbitrageurs. In
the case of a stock merger, the stock price of a target firm is typically traded at a
discount to the acquirer’s offer price after the announcement date of a merger. The
arbitrage spread refers to the difference between the acquirer’s offer price and the
target’s stock price. Risk arbitrageurs (merger arbitrageurs) attempt to earn a profit
from this spread. In a stock merger, risk arbitrageurs lock in the spread by going long
in the stock of a target firm and going short in the stock of an acquirer.
Third, short sales can be motivated by tax reasons. “Short sales against the
box” are one type of short selling activity in which investors short sell a security that
he/she holds a long position. Prior to June 1997, a short sale against the box enabled
an investor to lock in a profit without recognizing the related capital gains tax
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immediately. This ability to defer capital gains tax was beneficial to investors
especially when investors were taxed at a lower rate in the following tax period. Dyl
(1978) develops an analytical framework in which a short seller faces a trade-off
between the benefits from the delayed recognition of capital gains tax and the cost of
the unavailability of sales proceeds. He suggests that the length of time that a short
position is open, the current and future tax rate for the investor, and the size of the
capital gain all affect an investor’s decision to short sale against the box. He argues
that an investor who engages in short sales against the box follows a “minimum cost
strategy” by increasing short selling at the end of the tax year and covering the short
position early in the subsequent year such that he/she can keep the time of the open
short position short.

If an investor follows this strategy, we expect an increase in

short interest in December and a decrease in short interest in the following January.
Brent, et al. (1990) find that an average increase in the aggregate market short interest
is largest (5.45%) in December and an average aggregate market short interest
decreases significantly (-6.12%) in January in the following year.
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (henceforth TRA1997) eliminates this tax
loophole. TRA1997 classifies short sales against the box as constructive sales;
therefore, an investor who adopts a short sale against the box trading strategy can no
longer defer the capital gains tax, but recognize the related taxable gain immediately.
Arnold, et al. (2002) examine the impact of TRA1997 on the information content of
short interest and find that short interest conveys more bearish information after
TRA1997 for a large sample of NYSE firms.
with the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model.
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Their empirical result is consistent

I hypothesize that only speculative short selling is informative. Speculative
short sellers are sophisticated investors that are well informed. They have skills,
expertise, and ability to conduct fundamental analysis and identify securities that are
overvalued by the capital market. Firms that are heavily shorted by speculative short
sellers experience lower future returns. In contrast, short sales for arbitrage, hedging,
and tax purposes are non- informative. I refer to this non- information motivated short
selling as non-speculative trading in the short selling market.

Richardson (2003)

does not distinguish between speculative short sellers from short sellers motivated by
other reasons such as arbitrage, hedging, and tax purposes.

Using the total short

selling activities for a specific security instead of focusing on short selling motivated
by speculative purpose only introduces noise in the empirical examination of the
relationship between short sellers and earnings management.

Hence, unlike

Richardson (2003), my study focuses on speculative short selling only.
Speculative short selling is information based short selling activity.

I

control for non- information based short selling by constructing a few control
variables. Specifically, I use a dummy variable (Option Dummy) to indicate whether
the security has a traded option, a dummy variable (Convertible Dummy) to indicate
whether the security has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, and a dummy
variable (Merger Dummy) to indicate whether there is a stock merger announcement
in which the sample firm is an acquirer. These variables are used to control for short
selling activity for hedging and arbitrage purposes.
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) document that short sellers are more likely
to be informed traders because short selling incurs higher costs than selling outright.
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Moreover, short selling has more restrictions than a direct sale. They characterize
short interest as a bearish indicator. Their model predicts that an increase in the costs
of short selling increases the bearish information content of the short interest. Recent
empirical studies provide supporting evidence that short interest conveys negative
information on the underlying security. Dechow, et al. (2001) document that short
sellers target overpriced stocks reflected by the low ratios of fundamentals to market
values and cover their short positions as the ratios revert. Speculative short sellers are
informed investors who bet the decrease in stock price and thus profit from the price
difference accordingly.
The accrual anomaly is well documented in accounting literature.
Specifically, Sloan (1996) documents that the accrual component of earnings is
overpriced. His evidence suggests that investors underestimate the persistence of the
cash flow component of current earnings and overestimate the persistence of the
accrual component of current earnings. The prospect of future earnings conveyed by
the current earnings of the firm does not fully impound into the stock price promptly.
Firms with high total accruals tend to experience negative future abnormal stock
returns. Hedge portfolios yield significantly positive size-adjusted abnormal returns
in the following three years after the portfolio formation date.
Xie (2001) further decomposes total accruals into its discretionary accruals
and non-discretionary accruals components and examines whether the two
components are mispriced.

He demonstrates that the discretionary component of

accruals is overpriced and this overpricing contributes greatly to the mispricing of
total accruals.
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Collins and Hribar (2000) extend Sloan’s (1996) study by empirically
examining whether there is an accrual anomaly using quarterly earnings data. They
provide evidence that the market systematically overprices (underprices) the accrual
(cash flow) component of quarterly earnings. They also find that the accrual (cash
flow) mispricing is distinct from the post-earnings announcement drift ano maly.
Their study focuses on total quarterly accruals only.
In this study, I use both quarterly earnings data and annual earnings data to
empirically investigate whether speculative short sellers can detect earnings
management.

First, I examine whether short sellers utilize information in the total

accrual component of earnings.

Second, I decompose total accruals into its

discretionary and non-discretionary components and examine whether short sellers
can detect earnings management by targeting stocks with large income- increasing
discretionary accruals. I predict that securities with both high total accruals and
income- increasing discretionary accruals have lower future returns. I hypothesize that
speculative short sellers are informed and exploit the accrual anomaly by trading on
the information content of the mispriced total accruals. In addition, I hypothesize that
speculative short sellers are sophisticated enough to distinguish between the
discretionary and non-discretionary components of accruals and exploit the
overvaluation of the discretionary component by targeting stocks with large incomeincreasing discretionary accruals.

In sum, I hypothesize that sophisticated short

sellers can detect income- increasing earnings management. My hypotheses stated in
the alternative forms are as follows:
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H1: Speculative short interest is positively related to quarterly total
accruals.
H2: Speculative short interest is positively related to quarterly
discretionary accruals.
H3: Speculative short interest is positively related to total accruals.
H4: Speculative short interest is positively related to discretionary
accruals.
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4.

SAMPLE SELECTION, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, VARIABLE
DEFINITIONS

4.1 Sample Selection
My empirical analysis centers on the relationship between short interest and
both quarterly earnings and annual earnings of NYSE firms. It follows that the data
in this study include two samples.

The first sample consists of all firm-quarter

observations while the second sample consists of all firm- year observations. The
final sample of all firm-quarter (firm- year) observations has to meet the following
criteria:
(1) The firm has reported monthly short interest data for June,
September, and December in the current year and April in the
following year. The monthly short interest data is compiled by the
NYSE.
(2) The firm has fiscal- year end of 12/31.
(3) The firm has available annual or quarterly accounting data from
Research Insight such as earnings, dividend, and other information
required for estimation of non-discretionary accruals (discretionary
accruals).
(4) Firms are non- financial NYSE firms. Firms with two-digit SIC code
between 60 and 67 are excluded.
(5) The firm has stock return information and the number of shares
outstanding information from the Center for Research in Security
Price (CRSP) database over the period of 1992-1999.
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Tables 1 and 2 report the sample selection process and its influence on the
final sample size for quarterly and annual data respectively. For the quarterly data, I
first obtain data of short selling activity from the short interest database compiled by
NYSE. The monthly short interest data that matches fiscal quarters includes 86,410
firm-quarter observations. I exclude firms whose fiscal-year end is not December and
sample is reduced to 35,051. I further eliminate firm-quarter observations for which
discretionary accruals cannot be estimated using the cross-sectional modified Jones
model due to insufficient accounting information from the Research Insight database.
I also exclude financial service firms that have a two-digit SIC code between 60 and
67, inclusive. Finally, I exclude observations that lack information on stock returns
and the number of shares outstanding from CRSP. The final sample consists of
11,537 firm-quarter observations. Similarly, for the annual data, all selection criteria
bring the final sample to 5,118 firm-year observations for 1,146 firms.
The quarterly accounting data from Research Insight is available only after
1991. My sample period ranges from 1992 to 1999. Short interest from June 1992
through April 1999 is obtained from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). NYSE
compiles short interest data monthly based on the short positions held as of settlement
on the 15th of each month. The corresponding trade date is the eighth of each month.
For example, short interest data for April 1999 corresponds to the short interest over
the period from the ninth of March 1999 to the eighth of April 1999. The short
interest data compiled by NYSE is advantageous because it includes all firms traded
on NYSE. There is no selection bias involved. Prior studies in short sale uses short
sale data reported in newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal. Short sale data
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Table 1 Sample Selection for Quarterly Data
Sample Selection Criteria

Firm-quarter
Observations
86,410

Number of
Observations in the
Sample
86,410

Less: Observations for which the firm has nonDecember fiscal year end

(51,359)

35,051

Less: Observations for which discretionary accruals
cannot be estimated using cross-sectional modified
Jones model due to unavailability of data from
Research Insight

(20,477)

14,574

Less: Observations that are financial service firms

(1,376)

13,198

Less: Observations without available stock returns
and the number of shares outstanding data from
CRSP

(1,661)

11,537

Observations for which short interest data is
available

Observations by Quarter
First Quarter
Second Quarter
Third Quarter
Fourth Quarter

2,664
2,656
2,725
3,492

Observations by Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

1,143
1,160
1,358
1,603
1,901
2,106
2,266
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Table 2 Sample Selection for Annual Data
Sample Selection Criteria

Firm-year
Observations
22,312

Number of
Observations in the
Sample
22,312

(13,119)

9,193

(2,957)

6,236

Less: Observations that are financial service firms

(680)

5,556

Less: Observations without available stock returns
and the number of shares outstanding data from
CRSP

(438)

5,118

Observations for which short interest data is
available
Less: Observations for which the firm has nonDecember fiscal year end
Less: Observations for which discretionary accruals
cannot be estimated using cross-sectional modified
Jones model due to unavailability of data from
Research Insight

Observations by Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

504
555
664
739
807
883
966
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from this source is incomplete. Newspaper typically discloses short sale information
only for firms that have large short positions or firms that have a large change in short
interest.

The reporting criteria depend on the assessment of “large”, which varies

across time. For example, from October 1992 to September 1993, the Wall Street
Journal reports short sales for firms with more than 150,000 shares to be sold short or
short position changes by at least 50,000 from the previous month whereas in August
1995, the Wall Street Journal reports short sales for firms with more than 300,000
shares have been sold short or the number of shares sold short changes by more than
50,000 from the last month (Asquith and Meulbroek 1995). It follows that firms
whose short position does not meet the reporting criteria will not appear in the
newspaper even though the relative short interest (short interest divided by the
number of shares outstanding) may be very high. Thus, research based on short
interest data from the news source is biased against these firms. Using the complete
short sale data compiled by NYSE eliminate selection bias that may arise using short
interest data from news source.
The accounting data are from the Standard and Poor’s Research Insight
database, and the stock price and return information is from the Center for Research
in Security Price (CRSP) database.

Options Clearing Corporation provides

information on whether the stocks have traded options. I obtain information on which
stocks have convertible securities from the Research Insight database.

The stock

merger data are extracted from the merger and acquisition database from the
Securities Data Company (SDC). Data sources are demonstrated in Table 3.
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Table 3
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
This table presents definitions and data sources of the dependent variable, independent
variables and control variables used in the study.

Variables
Relative Short Interest

Specification
Short interest divided by the number of
shares outstanding

Source
Short interest data complied
by NYSE

Total Accruals
(Quarter)

Difference between quarterly earnings
before extraordinary items and
quarterly cash flows from operations
scaled by the total assets at the
beginning of the quarter

Research Insight

Total Accruals
(Annual)

Difference between annual earnings
before extraordinary items and annual
cash flows from operations scaled by
the total assets at the beginning of the
fiscal year

Research Insight

Discretionary Accruals
(Quarter)

Difference between quarterly total
accruals and the non-discretionary
quarterly accruals estimated using
adapted cross-sectional modified Jones
model

Research Insight

Discretionary Accruals
(Annual)

Difference between annual total
accruals and the non-discretionary
annual accruals estimated using crosssectional modified Jones model

Research Insight

Option Dummy

Dummy variable whose value is set to 1
if the stock has a traded option and zero
otherwise
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Options Clearing Corporation

Table 3 –Continued
Convertible Dummy

Dummy variable whose value is set to 1
if the stock has a convertible debt or
convertible preferred stock

Research Insight

Merger Dummy

Dummy variable whose value is set to 1
if the firm is an acquirer in a stock
merger during the given month.

Securities Data Corporation

Ln (Volume)

The natural logarithm of one plus the
average daily trading volume

Short interest data complied
by NYSE

Ln (SIZE)

The natural logarithm of firm size
calculated as the sum of market value
of common stock and the book value of
debt and the preferred stock

Research Insight

Dividend Yield

Quarterly or annual dividend yield

Research Insight

Stock Return

Stock return compounded from the 9th
of the previous month to the 8th of the
current month

CRSP

Market Return

CRSP value-weighted return
compounded from the 9th of the
previous month to the 8th of the current
month

CRSP
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4.2 Sample Industry Distribution
Table 4 reports the industry distribution of sample firms.

The industry

composition is based on the annual data. The sample includes 1,146 firms from 52
industries classified by the two-digit SIC code. The large number of industry
classification suggests the sample firms are representative of the universe of the
industry. The relative large group of firms are from mining industry (SIC code 10,
13, 14), electric, gas and sanitary services (SIC code 49) and service industry (SIC
code 70-87).
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of the variables of interest for a full
sample of 11,537 firm quarters for non-financial NYSE firms over the period of
1992-1999. The mean and median size of the firm is 6,776 and 1,606 million dollars
respectively. Firm size has a minimum value of $19 million and a maximum value of
$509,278 million. In this study, I use the natural logarithm of the sum of the market
value of common stock and the book value of debt and preferred stock to control for
firm size.
NYSE reports short interest data covering more than 3,000 firms on average
in the sample period except 1992 and 1993. In this study, I include all firms in the
NYSE short interest report in a given month with available quarterly accounting data
from Research Insight and stock return data from CRSP. The short interest in a given
month ranges from zero to 42.6% of outstanding shares. The mean (median) short
position as a percentage of the number of shares outstanding is 1.73% (0.78%).
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Table 4 Sample Composition by Industry
This table reports the industry distribution of the 1,146 firms.
Industry
Mining
Construction
Food and Kindred
Products
Textile Products
Lumber and Wood
Products, Furniture
Paper and Allied
Products
Printing and Publishing
Chemical and Allied
Product
Petroleum and Coal
Plastic and Leather
Products
Stone, Clay, Glass and
Concrete Products
Metal
Industrial and
Commercial
Machinery and
Computer Equipment
Electric Equipment and
Components
Transportation
Equipment
Measurement,
Analyzing, Control
Instrument and related
Product
Miscellaneous
Manufacturing
Transportation Service
Communications
Electric, Gas &
Sanitary Services
Whole Sale Trade
Retail Trade
Services
Public Administration
Total

Number of Firms
109
17

SIC code
10,13,14
15,16,17

Percentage
9.51
1.48

28

20

2.44

17

22, 23

1.48

23

24,25

2.01

34

26

2.97

28

27

2.44

93

28

8.12

29

29

2.53

25

30, 31

2.18

18

32

1.57

77

33, 34

6.72

65

35

5.67

56

36

4.89

39

37

3.40

34

38

2.97

10

39

0.87

37
50

40,42,44,45,47
48

3.23
4.36

134

49

11.69

35
42
139
7
1,146

50,51
52-59
70-87
99

3.05
3.66
12.13
0.61
100
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics (Quarterly Data)
This table reports the summary statistics of the dependent (independent) variables for the full sample of firm quarter observations from 1992 to 1999.
Variables
Relative Short
Interest

Minimum

Lower Quartile

Mean

Median

Upper Quartile

Maximum

Std Dev

0.0000

0.0029

0.0173

0.0078

0.0181

0.4259

0.0290

Discretionary
Accruals

-1.4857

-0.0823

-0.0414

-0.0148

0.0204

0.9807

0.1243

Total Accruals

-1.4818

-0.1380

-0.0766

-0.0569

-0.0044

0.9984

0.1179

Convertible
Dummy

0.0000

0.0000

0.1435

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

0.3505

Option Dummy

0.0000

0.0000

0.5610

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

0.4963

11.0000

21,118

282,357

86,619

281,395

18,928,031

610,018

2.4849

9.9579

11.0628

11.3693

12.5475

16.7562

2.1377

19.0150

568.0250

6,775.5457

1,605.9190

4,791.2610

509,278

20,493

Ln(Size)

2.9452

6.3422

7.4605

7.3815

8.4746

13.1408

1.5854

Dividend Yield

0.0000

0.0000

0.0047

0.0035

0.0068

1.4271

0.0149

Merger Dummy

0.0000

0.0000

0.0062

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

0.0782

Stock
Return

-0.5195

-0.0459

0.0073

0.0078

0.0598

1.4354

0.1024

Market Return

-0.0778

-0.0055

0.0129

0.0218

0.0434

0.0530

0.0354

Volume
Ln(Volume)
Size
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of the average relative short interest in June,
September, December, and April in each year from 1992 to 1999. Short interest
reaches the maximum in April 1998. The average relative short interest is 2.17% for
sample firms in April 1998.
The summary statistics show that 56.10% of firm-quarter observations have
traded options. In addition, 14.35% of the firm-quarter observations have convertible
securities in the form of either convertible debt or convertible preferred stock.
Among all firm-quarter observations, 0.6% of firms announced a stock merger in
which firms are acquirers in the month of June, September, and December in the
current year and April in the following year. The mean and median values of the
quarterly dividend yield (dollar dividends divided by the market value by the end of
the fiscal quarter) are 0.47% and 0.35% respectively. On average, the stock return
from the ninth of the previous month to the eighth of the current month is 0.73%; the
relevant market index return over the same period is 1.3%. The distribution of the
average daily trading volume varies greatly across firm-quarters with a minimum of
11 and a maximum of 18,928,031. I measure trading volume as the natural logarithm
of one plus the average trading volume to mitigate the skewness. The mean and the
median of total quarterly accruals are –0.077 and –0.057 respectively. Discretionary
accruals range from –1.49 to 0.98 with a mean (median) value of –0.04 (–0.015).
Table 6 reports summary statistics for a sample of 5,118 firm- year
observations for non-financial NYSE firms over the period of 1992-1999. Firm size
has a minimum value of $3.36 million and a maximum of $508,713 million. The
average size of the firm is $6,865 million. The distribution of average daily trading
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Relative Short Interest Over the Sample Period
1992-1999

0.025

0.015

0.01

0.005

19
98
12

19
98
06

19
97
12

19
97
06

19
96
12

19
96
06

19
95
12

19
95
06

19
94
12

19
94
06

19
93
12

19
93
06

19
92
12

0
19
92
06

Relative Short Interest

0.02

Year/Month

Figure 1 Average Relative Short Interest over the Sample Period of 1992-1999
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Table 6 Descriptive Statistics (Annual Data)
This table reports the summary statistics of the dependent (independent) variables for the full sample of firm year observations from 1992 to 1999.
Variables
Relative Short
Interest

Minimum

Lower Quartile

Mean

Median

Upper Quartile

Maximum

Std Dev

0.0000

0.0026

0.01849

0.0080

0.0187

0.8337

0.0359

Discretionary
Accruals

-1.5291

-0.0273

0.0102

0.0082

0.0465

5.8539

0.1358

Total Accruals

-1.4242

-0.0835

-0.0549

-0.0509

-0.0218

0.8504

0.0900

Convertible
Dummy

0.0000

0.0000

0.1331

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

0.3397

Option Dummy

0.0000

0.0000

0.4912

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

0.5000

Volume

9.0000

19,680

282,985

85,140

277,977

18,928,031

650,201

Ln(Volume)

2.3026

9.8874

11.0486

11.3521

12.5353

16.7562

2.1510

Size

3.3630

586.7350

6,865.2615

1,759.3750

5,221.9620

508,713

19,413

Ln(Size)

1.2128

6.3746

7.5050

7.4727

8.5606

13.1396

1.6225

Dividend Yield

0.0000

0.0000

0.0208

0.0143

0.0302

1.6692

0.0341

Merger Dummy

0.0000

0.0000

0.0035

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

0.0592

-0.4943

-0.0467

0.0130

0.0045

0.0606

1.4354

0.1114

Stock
Return
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volume is highly skewed with mean and median of 282,985 and 85,140 respectively.
The relative short interest in April following each fiscal year end from 1992 to 1998
ranges from zero percent to 83.37% of the number of shares outstanding at the time
when short interest is measured. On average, short interest is 1.8% of the number of
shares outstanding.

The dividend yield at fiscal year end has mean and median of

2.08% and 1.43% respectively. Total accruals have a mean and median of –0.055 and
–0.051 whereas discretionary accruals have a mean and median of 0.01 and 0.008
respectively. Table 6 indicates that 49% of the firm- year observations have a traded
option and 13% have either convertible debt or convertible preferred stock. The
statistics also show that 0.35% of the annual data are involved in a stock merger in
which the firm is an acquirer with an announcement date falling into the period from
March 9th to April 8th in the years 1993 to 1999. On average, the contemporaneous
return on the stock is 1.3% with a minimum return of –49.43% and a maximum return
of 143.54%.
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND MODEL
5.1 Research Design
My analysis of both quarterly and annual data consists of two parts. In the
first part, I estimate discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. In
the second part, I utilize multivariate regression models to examine whether short
sellers can identify the income-increasing earnings management through discretionary
accruals and the information content of total accruals.
5.2 Discretionary Accruals Estimation for Quarterly Data
I estimate quarterly accruals as the difference between quarterly earnings
before extraordinary items (Research Insight Item #8) and qua rterly cash flows from
operations 3 scaled by total assets at the beginning of the quarter. I measure earnings
management through discretionary accruals by employing the cross-sectional
modified Jone’s model adapted on a quarterly basis. This measurement is consistent
with the earnings management estimation documented in Balsam, et al. (2002). The
discretionary accruals model was advocated by Jones (1991), developed using a
cross-sectional approach by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and modified by Dechow,
et al. (1995). Discretionary accruals are measured as the difference between total
accruals and non-discretionary accruals.

The non-discretionary component of

accruals is a two-step estimate. In the first step, I regress total accruals on the change
in revenues scaled by total assets at the beginning of the quarter and on gross
property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets at the beginning of the quarter.

3

Research insight reports data from the statement of cash flows on a cumulative basis. For the 2nd , 3rd and
4 quarters of a fiscal year, the cash flows from operation are calculated by taking the difference between
cash flows from operations (item #108) for the current quarter and cash flows from operations for the
previous quarter.
th
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Firms are categorized into different industry groups based on the two-digit SIC code.
I estimate the model separately for each industry group and each fiscal quarter using
all firm-quarters with available accounting data, the same two-digit SIC code, and
December fiscal year-end. Any industry group with fewer than 10 firms is excluded.
In the second step, I calculate non-discretionary accruals based on the parameter
estimates from the cross-sectional Jone’s model and adjust the change in revenues by
the change in receivables (Equation 1).

[(

ACCRQ jt / TAQjt −1 = α1 (1 / TAQjt −1 ) + α 2 ∆REVQ

jt

)

]

(

)

− ∆RECQ jt / TAQjt −1 + α3 PPEQ jt / TAQjt −1 + ε jt

(1)
Where ACCRQ = total accruals in the current quarter;
TAQ = total assets at the beginning of the quarter;
?REVQ = change in revenue from the last quarter;
?RECQ = change in receivables from the last quarter;

PPEQ = gross property, plant and equipment in the current quarter.
Quarterly discretionary accruals are measured as the difference between
total accruals and non-discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets at the
beginning of the quarter.
5.3 Model Specification for Quarterly Data
Firms are required to file their 10-Q reports with the SEC within 45 days
after the end of the fiscal quarter. 4 I assume that short sellers conduct fundamental
analysis using information in the quarterly financial accounting report when the 10-Q
4

Easton and Zmijewski (1993) analyze 193,283 10-Q filings and find that on average, 10-Qs become
publicly available 44.7 days after the fiscal quarter.
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report becomes publicly available and establish short positions in stocks with high
total accruals and large income-increasing discretionary accruals. Thus, I measure the
dependent variable (short selling activity) as the relative short interest 45 days after
the fiscal quarter-end for a sample of all firm-quarter observations. The relative short
interest is defined as short interest divided by the number of shares outstanding on the
eighth of that month to match the trade date of the short interest data. The monthly
short interest data includes the short selling activity from the ninth of the previous
month to the eighth of the current month. Hence, I use the short interest data in the
month of June, September, and December in the current year to match the
discretionary accruals (total accruals) data in the 1st , 2nd, and 3rd quarters respectively.
In addition, firms typically file 10-K report within 90 days after the fiscal year end.
Thus, I match relative short interest data in April in the following year with
discretionary accruals (total accruals) in the 4th quarter.
I employ quarterly discretionary accruals (total accruals) as the independent
variable to examine the relationship between short selling and discretionary accruals
(total accruals). I also include other control variables in the regression analysis. Sias
and Starks (1997) document that institutional ownership and firm size is correlated.
Large firms are likely to have high institutional ownership. Firms with high levels of
institutional ownership have more stocks available to be bought and sold short. Thus,
I use firm size to control for the availability of shares in the regression. Firm size is
measured as the natural logarithm of the sum of market value of the common equity
and the book value of total debt and preferred stock. Stocks with high trading volume
are more liquid. Graham, et al. (1999) argues that short sellers are more likely to trade
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in stocks with lower transaction costs. Short interest is expected to be higher for
stocks with high trading volume. I include the natural logarithm of one plus the
average daily trading volume from the ninth of the previous month to the eighth of
the current month in the regression. As discussed earlier, dividends increase the costs
for short sellers. Stocks with higher dividend yields are less likely to be sold short,
ceteris paribus.

I employ quarterly dividend yield as another determinant of short

selling activity.

I also use the stock return compounded from the ninth of the

previous month to the eighth of the current month to control for stock performance.
Similarly, my regression includes the CRSP value-weighted market return
compounded over the same period to match the trade date of short selling and to
control for overall market performance.
In the following analysis, I also control for non-information-based
determinants of short selling because this study focuses on information motivated
short selling. Previous studies have shown that short selling may be used for hedging
and arbitrage purposes; furthermore, stocks with traded options have higher levels of
short interest (Brent, et al. 1990; Graham, et al. 1999). I include an option dummy
variable to capture the effect of traded options. The value of the option dummy
variable is set to 1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise. Brent, et al.
(1990) and Graham, et al. (1999) argue that the convertible security holder may
engage in short selling for hedging purposes because of the imbedded option on the
stock. Thus, I also construct a convertible security dummy variable in my analysis. I
also include year dummy variables to control for time specific effect in the models.
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Table 3 summarizes the dependent variable, independent variable and other control
variables.
The models for all firm-quarter observations are summarized in the
following regressions:
Model 1
Relative Short Interest = β + β * Discretion ary Accruals + β * Option Dummy + β * Convertible
0

1

2

3

Dummy + β * Trading Volume+ β * Dividend Yield
+ β * Stock Return + β * Market Return + β * Merger Dummy
4

5

6

7

8

+ ∑∑ β Year Dummy + ε
98

14

i =93

j =9

j

i

Model 2
Relative Short Interest = β + β * Total Accruals + β * Option Dummy + β * Convertible
0

1

2

3

Dummy + β * Trading Volume+ β * Dividend Yield
+ β * Stock Return + β * Market Return + β * Merger Dummy
4

5

6

7

8

+ ∑∑ β Year Dummy + ε
98

14

i =93

j =9

j

i

The models for firm-quarter observations by each fiscal quarter are as fo llows:
Model 1
Relative Short Interest = β + β * Discretion ary Accruals + β * Option Dummy + β * Convertible
0

1

2

3

Dummy + β * Trading Volume+ β * Dividend Yield
+ β * Stock Return + β * Merger Dummy
4

5

6

7

+ ∑∑ β Year Dummy + ε
98

13

i =93

j =8

j

i

Model 2
Relative Short Interest = β + β * Discretion ary Accruals + β * Option Dummy + β * Convertible
0

1

2

Dummy + β * Firm Size + β * Dividend Yield
+ β * Stock Return + β * Merger Dummy
4

5

6

7

+ ∑∑ β Year Dummy + ε
98

13

i =93

j =8

j

i
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3

Model 3
Relative Short Interest = β + β * Total Accruals + β * Option Dummy + β * Convertible
0

1

2

3

Dummy + β * Trading Volume+ β * Dividend Yield
+ β * Stock Return + β * Merger Dummy
4

5

6

7

+ ∑∑ β Year Dummy + ε
98

13

i =93

j =8

j

i

Model 4
Relative Short Interest = β + β * Total Accruals + β * Option Dummy + β * Convertible
0

1

2

3

Dummy + β * Firm Size + β * Dividend Yield
+ β * Stock Return + β * Merger Dummy
4

5

6

7

+ ∑∑ β Year Dummy + ε
98

13

i =93

j =8

j

i

5.4 Discretionary Accruals Estimation for Annual Data
Many accounting researchers attempt to develop an adequate accrual model
to capture earnings management through discretionary accruals. Several studies have
developed time-series discretionary accrual models (e.g. Healy 1985; DeAngelo
1986; Jones 1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Dechow, et al. 1995). Among these five
accrual models, the Jones and the Modified Jones model are widely used because they
are better specified and are more powerful.
Time-series models require continuous observations for a given firm over
several years and thus impose an assumption of stationarity on the series. Recent
studies overcome the restrictions of time-series models by switching to acrosssectional variation of the model. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Subramanyam
(1996a) develop a cross-sectional Jones model. They argue that this cross-sectional

53

estimation mitigates the survivorship bias and increases the precision of estimates due
to larger sample sizes. However, the principal disadvantage of the model is ignorance
of the variation in parameter estimates. Bartov, et al. (2001) provides evidence of the
superior performance of the cross-sectional Jones and modified Jones models to their
time-series counterparts in the context of audit qualification.
I employ the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model to estimate
discretionary accruals because it is the most widely used accrual model in the extant
earnings management literature.

Specifically, I calculate total accruals as the

difference between earnings before extraordinary items and the cash flows from
operations divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Total accruals are
regressed on the change in revenues scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year
and gross property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets at the beginning of the
year. The model is estimated for each fiscal year using all firm- year observations
with the same two-digit SIC code and December fiscal year end. I exclude firm- year
observations whose industry category has fewer than 10 firms with the required
information for estimation.

Discretionary accruals are the residuals of the model

after making an adjustment by subtracting the change in receivables from the change
in revenues.

The model after adjustment is presented in the following

equation:
ACCR / TA = α (1 / TA ) + α [(∆REV − ∆REC ) / TA
jt

jt −1

1

jt −1

2

jt

jt

Where ACCR = total accruals in the current year;
TA = total assets at the beginning of the year;

?REV = change in revenue from the last year;
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jt −1

] + α (PPE
3

jt

/ TA

jt −1

)+ε

jt

( 2)

?REC = change in receivables from the last year;
PPE = gross property, plant and equipment in the current year.
5.5 Model Specification for Annual Data
The SEC requires that firms file 10-K reports within 90 days after the fiscal
year-end. Alford, Jones, and Zmijewski (1994) report that more than eighty percent
of firms file their 10-K reports within this required period. Hence, I measure short
selling activity as relative short interest three months after the fiscal year-end for a
sample of all firm- year observations.
The dependent variable is relative short interest from March 9 to April 8 in
the subsequent year. In model 1, I employ discretionary accruals estimated from the
annual data as the independent variable.

The control variables include the natural

logarithm of one plus the average daily trading volume from March 9 to April 8 in the
following year, the contemporaneous stock return over the same period, stock
dividend yield, a merger dummy variable to control for the risk arbitrage in stock
merger, an option dummy variable, a convertible dummy to control for short selling
for arbitrage and hedging purpose, and the year dummy variables to control for time
specific effect. In model 2, total accruals are used as independent variable and the
other control variables are the same as those in model 1. The following regressions
represent these two models:
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Model 1
Relative Short Interest = β + β * Discretion ary Accruals + β * Option Dummy + β * Convertible
0

1

2

3

Dummy + β * Trading Volume+ β * Dividend Yield
+ β * Stock Return + β * Merger Dummy
4

5

6

7

+ ∑∑ β Year Dummy + ε
98

13

i =93

j =8

j

i

Model 2
Relative Short Interest = β + β * Total Accruals + β * Option Dummy + β * Convertible
0

1

2

3

Dummy + β * Trading Volume+ β * Dividend Yield
+ β * Stock Return + β * Merger Dummy
4

5

6

7

+ ∑∑ β Year Dummy + ε
98

13

i =93

j =8

j

i
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6.1 Univariate Analysis
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for short selling groups constructed
based on the level of short selling activities. Specifically, two groups are formed.
Low level of relative short interest group includes firm quarters with relative short
interest no greater than the mean of relative short interest of all firm-quarter
observations. High level of relative short interest group consists of firm quarters with
relative short interest greater than the mean of the relative short interest of all firmquarter observations. Discretionary accruals for the low relative short interest group
and high relative short interest group are -0.043 and –0.036 respectively.

Mean

discretionary accruals of these two groups are significantly different (t-statistic=
–2.71).

Similarly, low relative short interest group has significantly lower total

accruals (t-statistic= –2.43). Consistent with the notion that short selling could be
motivated by arbitrage and hedging purpose, the high level of relative short interest
group has stocks that are more likely to have traded options, convertible debt or
convertible preferred stock, and be an acquirer in a stock merger. Moreover, stocks
with high levels of short interest have lower dividend yield, supporting the notion that
stocks with lower costs attract short sellers. In addition, stocks with higher short
selling activity tend to be large firm and firms that are heavily traded. Finally, stock
returns and market returns are not significantly different between two groups.
Table 8 presents Pearson correlation coefficients and related p-values.
Quarterly accruals are significantly and positively related to short selling activities
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of Short Selling Groups
This table presents the descriptive statistics of short selling groups. The low level of relative short interest group
includes firm quarters with relative short interest no greater than the mean of relative short interest of all firmquarter observations. The high level of relative short interest group consists of firm quarters with relative short
interest greater than the mean of the relative short interest of all firm-quarter observations.
Low Level of
Relative Short
Interest

High level of
Relative Short
Interest

Variables

Mean

Mean

Mean

t-statistic

p-value

Discretionary Accruals

-0.043

-0.036

-0.007

-2.71

0.0067

Total Accruals

-0.078

-0.072

-0.006

-2.43

0.0151

Ln(Volume)

10.777

11.860

-1.083

-27.30

<0.0001

Ln(Size)

7.421

7.571

-0.150

-5.24

<0.0001

Dividend Yield

0.0051

0.0036

0.0015

7.16

<0.0001

Stock Return

0.0077

0.0062

0.0015

0.62

0.5332

Market Return

0.0129

0.0130

-0.000035

-0.05

0.9641

Convertible Dummy

0.0855

0.2890

-0.2340

-24.75

<0.0001

Option Dummy

0.5027

0.6776

-0.201

-18.13

<0.0001

Merger Dummy

0.0034

0.0138

-0.010

-4.71

<0.0001

Number of observations

8,495

3,042
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Difference

Table 8 Pearson Correlation Coefficients
This table presents correlation coefficients for variables of interest for 11,537 firm quarter observations. The probability that each
correlation is different from zero (p-value) is reported in the parentheses.
Variables
Relative
Short Interest
Discretionary
Accruals
Total
Accruals
Convertible
Dummy
Option
Dummy

Relative
Short Interest
1.0000

Discretionary
Accruals
0.0366
(<0.0001)

Total
Accruals
0.0387
(<0.0001)

Convertible
Dummy
0.2619
(<0.0001)

Option
Dummy
0.1312
(<0.0001)

Ln(Volume)

Ln(Size)

Stock Return

0.0093
(0.3176)

Dividend
Yield
-0.0338
(0.0003)

0.1940
(<0.0001)

1.0000

0.7146
(<0.0001)

0.0562
(<0.0001)

-0.0438
(<0.0001)

-0.0754
(<0.0001)

-0.0387
(<0.0001)

1.0000

0.0468
(<0.0001)

-0.0445
(<0.0001)

-0.0847
(<0.0001)

1.0000

0.0960
(<0.0001)
1.0000

Ln(Volume)
Ln(Size)
Dividend
Yield
Stock Return
Market
Return
Merger
Dummy

0.0130
(0.1638)

Market
Return
0.0066
(0.4802)

Merger
Dummy
0.0586
(<0.0001)

0.0106
(0.2566)

-0.0135
(0.1470)

-0.0528
(<0.0001)

0.0065
(0.4849)

-0.0930
(<0.0001)

-0.0136
(0.1441)

-0.0164
(0.0788)

0.0049
(0.5974)

0.0250
(0.0073)

0.0223
(0.0166)

0.0137
(0.1413)

-0.0160
(0.0865)

0.0167
(0.0728)

-0.0171
(0.0659)

0.0500
(<0.0001)

0.3356
(<0.0001)

0.4576
(<0.0001)

-0.0285
(0.0022)

0.0205
(0.0280)

-0.0076
(0.4139)

0.0227
(0.0147)

1.0000

0.5715
(<0.0001)

-0.0314
(0.0007)

0.0058
(0.5330)

0.0678
(<0.0001)

0.0411
(<0.0001)

1.0000

0.0233
(0.0125)

-0.0118
(0.2043)

-0.0166
(0.0751)

0.01740
(0.0616)

1.0000

-0.0058
(0.5365)

-0.0092
(0.3229)

-0.0082
(0.3777)

1.0000

0.3538
(<0.0001)

0.0224
(0.0161)

1.0000

0.0129
(0.1650)
1.0000
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with coefficient of 0.039 and a p-value less than 0.0001. This provides supporting
evidence that short sellers target stocks with higher accruals. In addition, I find a
significantly positive correlation between quarterly discretionary accruals and relative
short interest (coefficient=0.037 and p- value < 0.0001). The correlation coefficient is
0.037 and p-value is less than 0.0001. This is consistent with the prediction that short
seller detect earnings management through discretionary accruals by selling short
stocks with large income-increasing discretionary accruals.
Consistent with the conjecture that short selling may be motivated by
arbitrage and hedging, the option dummy variable, convertible dummy variable, and
the merger dummy variable are significantly and positively related to relative short
interest. The option dummy variable is highly correlated with the relative short
interest with a coefficient of 0.132 (p-value: <0.0001). This is consistent with prior
research that the existence of a traded option on the underlying stock increases short
selling activities (Figlewski and Webb 1993). The highly significant and positive
correlation coefficient between the convertible dummy variable and relative short
interest indicates that short selling may be motiva ted by hedging and arbitrage
purpose. This is consistent with Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) in that short selling is
an integral part of hedging and arbitrage strategy. The coefficient between the merger
dummy variable and the short selling activity is significantly positive, suggesting that
short sale is positively related to the risk arbitrage in the stock merger activities.
The quarterly dividend yield is significantly and negatively associated with
the percentage of shares sold short with a correlation coefficient of –0.034 and pvalue of 0.0003. Dividends increase the cost of short selling because short sellers are
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obligated to reimburse the equity owner any dividend declared during the time period
of a short sale. Additionally, short sellers essent ially repay the borrowed stock at a
higher price because of the ex-dividend day effect, that is, stock prices fail to adjust
fully for the dividend. This is consistent with the notion that stocks with lower short
selling costs attract short sellers.
Trading volume is significantly and positively correlated with relative short
interest (coefficient of 0.194 and p-value < 0.0001). This suggests that stocks with
high trading volume have a high level of short interest.

There is no significant

relation between firm size and short selling activity. I find that firm size and trading
volume are highly significantly and positively correlated (0.57). Thus, I use trading
volume and firm size alternatively in separate regression models.
6.2 Multivariate Analysis
6.2.1. Analysis of Full Sample of Firm-quarter Observations
The results of the multivariate analysis of the full sample of 11,537 firmquarter observations are presented in Table 9. This regression includes pooled data
for all fiscal quarters from 1992 to 1998. The first column reports regression results
using quarterly discretionary accruals as the independent variable (Model 1). The
second column presents the regression results using quarterly total accruals as the
independent variable (Model 2). The results indicate that relative short interest is
significantly and positively related to quarterly total accruals with a coefficient of
0.011 and t-statistic of 5.1. This implies that short sellers establish short positions in
stocks with high accruals.

61

Table 9: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and
Short Interest
(Quarterly Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest.
Data include 11,537 firm-quarter observations of non-financial NYSE stocks. The dependent variable is
relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares outstanding on the 8th of the given
month of the years from 1992 to 1999). The independent variables include the quarterly discretionary
accruals in four quarters estimated from cross-sectional modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis,
quarterly total accruals, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the stock has a traded option and
zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible
preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in a given
month and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one plus the average daily trading volume,
quarterly dividend yield, year dummy variables, the stock return, which is compounded from the 9th of the
previous month to the 8th of the current month, and the CRSP value-weighted index return compounded
from the 9th of the previous month to the 8th of the current month. T-statistics are reported in the
parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

-0.0125
(-9.02***)

-0.0123
(-8.86***)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

0.0024
(4.19***)

0.0024
(4.05***)

Convertible
Dummy

+

0.0209
(28.30***)

0.0209
(28.26***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0026
(14.03***)

0.0027
(14.32***)

Dividend Yield

–

-0.0376
(-2.20**)

-0.0359
(-2.10**)

Stock Return

0.0040
(1.47)

0.0043
(1.58)

Market Return

-0.0147
(-1.72*)

-0.0158
(-1.86**)

0.0128
(3.93***)

0.0125
(3.83***)

Merger Dummy

0.0092
(4.48***)
0.0111
(5.10***)

+
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Table 9 –Continued
Dummy 93-98

No of
Observations
Adjusted Rsquare
F Statistic
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Suppressed

Suppressed

11,537

11,537

0.1175

0.1179

110.68***

111.15***

Discretionary accruals are also significantly and positively associated with
short selling activity (coefficient: 0.009; t-statistic: 4.48). Short sellers appear able to
see through income-increasing earnings management and go short in the stocks with
high levels of discretionary accruals.

An increase in discretionary accruals is

associated with 0.9% increase in relative short interest.

Consistent with prior

research, stocks with traded options have higher levels of short interest, indicating
options facilitate short selling activity. The coefficient of Option Dummy is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. In model 1, this coefficient is 0.0024 with
t-statistic of 4.19 and p-value of less than 0.0001. In model 2, the coefficient is
0.0024 with t-statistic of 4.05 and p-value of less than 0.0001. The option market
makers increase the short positions in the underlying securities to hedge their
positions. Because investors may use options as a substitute for going short when
they have pessimistic beliefs, the positive coefficient indicates that options act as an
instrument to achieve an arbitrage strategy and this arbitrage-motivated short selling
dominates the alternative of short selling for speculative purposes. The coefficients
of Convertible Dummy in model 1 and model 2 are 0.0209 in both models and are
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that stocks with convertible
securities have higher levels of relative short interest. This is consistent with the
notion that arbitrageurs may establish short positions to offset the imbedded option on
the underlying security.
The coefficients of Merger Dummy are 0.0128 and 0.0125 in model 1 and
model 2 respectively. These significantly positive coefficients (p-value < 1%) of the
merger dummy variable suggest that risk arbitrageurs engage in short selling activity
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to lock in the arbitrage spread.

Trading volume is significantly and positively

associated with relative short interest. The coefficients of the trading volume are
0.0026 and 0.0027 for models 1 and 2 respectively. These two trading volume
coefficients are both significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that heavily
traded stocks have large short selling activity. This evidence is consistent with prior
studies in that short sellers target stocks with lower transaction costs. In addition, the
result shows that stocks with lower dividend yield are more likely to be sold short.
Dividend yield is inversely related to short selling activity.
dividend yield is –0.038 in model 1 and –0.036 in model 2.

The coefficient of
Both coefficients are

statistically significant at the 5% level. This evidence is consistent with prior studies
in that short sellers target stocks with lower costs of short selling. The result shows
no significant relation between contemporary stock return and short selling activity.
However, the contemporary market return is negatively related to the relative short
interest at the 10% level.
6.2.2. Analysis of Sample of Firm-quarter Observations by Separate Quarters
I conduct further analysis of the relation between speculative short selling
activity and accrual management by decomposing the quarterly data into four
different quarters.

The results are reported in Tables 10 through 13.

Quarterly

discretionary accruals are emplo yed as the independent variable in Models 1 and 2
and quarterly total accruals are used as the independent variable in Models 3 and 4,
respectively. Table 10 reports the regression results for the relationship between
relative short interest in June and discretionary accruals (total accruals) in the first
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Table 10 Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in June (Quarterly Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in June for the years 1992 through 1998. Data includes
2,664 firm-quarter observations of non-financial NYSE stocks. The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares
outstanding on the June 8 for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the first quarter, which are estimated from the
cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the first quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the stock has a
traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a merger dummy
variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one plus the
average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), dividend yield in the first
quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the May 9 to June 8 . t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, *
denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.0118
(-4.17***)

0.0076
(2.51***)

-0.0118
(-4.19***)

0.0076
(2.49***)

-0.0077
(-0.61)

-0.0059
(-0.46)
0.0095
(0.69)

0.0069
(0.50)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

0.0017
(1.48)

0.0064
(5.52***)

0.0017
(1.49)

0.0064
(5.52***)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0200
(13.63***)

0.0208
(14.11***)

0.0200
(13.63***)

0.0208
(14.11***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0027
(7.16***)

0.0027
(7.16***)

Firm Size

-0.0006
(-1.73*)
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-0.0006
(-1.72*)

Table 10-Continued
Dividend Yield

–

Stock Return

Merger Dummy

Dummy 93-98

No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

+

-0.3712
(-4.20***)

-0.3539
(-3.93***)

-0.3708
(-4.19***)

-0.3537
(-3.93***)

-0.0045
(-0.72)

-0.0041
(-0.63)

-0.0047
(-0.75)

-0.0043
(-0.68)

0.0138
(2.72***)

0.0135
(2.64***)

0.0137
(2.70***)

0.0134
(2.63***)

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

2,664
0.1274
30.91***

2,664
0.1116
26.72***

2,664
0.1275
30.92***

2,664
0.1116
26.73***
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quarter. There is no significant association between short selling activity and either
discretionary accruals or total accruals. Relative short interest is significantly and
positively related to the Option Dummy in Models 2 and 4. The Convertible Dummy
and Merger Dummy variables are positive and statistically significant at the l% level
in all four models, consistent with the notion that hedging and arbitrage can motivate
short selling. The Average Daily Trading Volume is positively related to short selling
activity in all four models. The coefficient on dividend yield is significantly negative
in all four models.
Table 11 reports the regression results for the association between short
interest in September (August 9 to September 8) and discretionary accruals (total
accruals) in the second quarter. The results show that discretionary accruals are
positively related to relative short interest. The coefficients of discretionary accruals
in Models 1 and 2 are 0.0108 and 0.0102 respectively.

These coefficients are

statistically significant at the 10% level. In Model 3, total accruals are positively
related to short selling activity with a coefficient of 0.0149, t-statistic of 2.34, and pvalue of 0.019. In Model 4, total accruals are marginally significant with p-value of
0.1001. The Option Dummy, Convertible Dummy, and Merger Dummy variables are
all systematically positively associated with relative sho rt interest.

The coefficient

on Trading Volume is significantly positive whereas the coefficient on the Firm Size
is significantly negative.
The results reported in Table 12 indicate that both discretionary accruals
and total accruals in the third quarter are significantly and positively related to the
percentage of the number of shares sold short in December (November 9 to

68

Table 11: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in September (Quarterly
Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in September for the years 1992 through 1998. Data
includes 2,656 firm-quarter observations of non-financial NYSE stocks. The dependent variable is re lative short interest (short interest divided by the number of
shares outstanding on September 8 for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the second quarter, which are
estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the second quarter, an option dummy variable, which is
set to 1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred
stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural
logarithm of one plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock),
dividend yield in the second quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from August 9 to September 8. t -statistics are reported in
the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.0094
(-3.30***)

0.0107
(3.48***)

-0.0094
(-3.30***)

0.0106
(3.47***)

0.0108
(1.87*)

0.0102
(1.75*)
0.0149
(2.34**)

0.0105
(1.64)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

0.0035
(2.97***)

0.0087
(7.37***)

0.0035
(2.94***)

0.0087
(7.34***)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0198
(13.22***)

0.0203
(13.57***)

0.0198
(13.24***)

0.0204
(13.61***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0022
(5.72***)

0.0023
(5.86***)

Firm Size

-0.0013
(-3.37***)
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-0.0012
(-3.25***)

Table 11-Continued
Dividend Yield

–

Stock Return

Merger Dummy

Dummy 93-98

No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

+

-0.1671
(-1.71*)

-0.0801
(-0.81)

-0.1541
(-1.57)

-0.0716
(-0.72)

0.0118
(1.92*)

0.0097
(1.57)

0.0121
(1.98**)

0.0098
(1.59)

0.0169
(2.38**)

0.0203
(2.84***)

0.0166
(2.33**)

0.0200
(2.81***)

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

2,656
0.1152
27.58***

2,656
0.1080
25.73***

2,656
0.1158
27.75***

2,656
0.1079
25.70***
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Table 12: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in December (Quarterly
Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in December for the years 1992 through 1998. Data
includes 2,725 firm-quarter observations of non-financial NYSE stocks. The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of
shares outstanding on December 8 for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the third quarter, which are estimated
from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the third quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the
stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a merger
dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one
plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), dividend yield in the
third quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from November 9 to December 8. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses.
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.0106
(-3.91***)

0.0090
(3.09***)

-0.0101
(-3.70***)

0.0093
(3.19***)

0.0110
(2.95***)

0.0100
(2.68***)
0.0143
(3.38***)

0.0110
(2.60***)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

0.0038
(3.33***)

0.0088
(7.67***)

0.0037
(3.25***)

0.0087
(7.57***)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0224
(15.36***)

0.0232
(15.89***)

0.0223
(15.31***)

0.0232
(15.89***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0022
(6.06***)

0.0023
(6.22***)

Firm Size

-0.0011
(-2.96***)
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-0.0010
(-2.76***)

Table 12-Continued
Dividend Yield

–

Stock Return

Merger Dummy

Dummy 93-98

No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

+

-0.0128
(-0.72)

-0.0124
(-0.69)

-0.0128
(-0.72)

-0.0125
(-0.70)

-0.0080
(-1.63)

-0.0076
(-1.55)

-0.0081
(-1.64)

-0.0078
(-1.59)

0.0086
(1.19)

0.0087
(1.20)

0.0082
(1.14)

0.0085
(1.17)

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

2,725
0.1369
34.24***

2,725
0.1280
31.77

2,725
0.1378
34.48

2,725
0.1279
31.73
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December 8). Specifically, the coefficients on discretionary accruals in Models 1 and
2 are 0.011 and 0.010 respectively. Similarly, the coefficients on total accruals in
Models 3 and 4 are 0.014 and 0.011 respectively.

These coefficients are all

statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that short sellers establish short
position in stocks with high accruals and large discretionary accruals in the third
quarter.

The Option Dummy and Convertible Dummy variables are positively

associated with relative short interest as predicted. Higher levels of Trading Volume
are related to higher levels of short interest.
The findings reported in Table 13 indicate a positive relationship between
discretionary accruals (total accruals) in the fourth quarter and short interest in April
(March 9 to April 8) in the subsequent year. The coefficient of discretionary accruals
is 0.0118 in Model 1 and 0.0109 in Model 2. The coefficient of total accruals is
0.0208 in Model 3 and 0.0165 in Model 4.

These four coefficients are larger in

magnitude and more significant than the four coefficients of discretionary accruals
(total accruals) in table 12. The Option Dummy is significantly and positively related
to relative short interest in Models 2 and 4. The Convertible Dummy is systematically
positively associated with short selling activity through all four models. Heavily
traded stocks have larger short positions.
In sum, the results from the analysis of firm-quarter observations suggest
that short sellers establish their short positions in stocks with high quarterly total
accruals (discretionary accruals). This provides strong evidence that short seller are
sophisticated investors. They utilize interim financial accounting information on a
timely basis and can detect earnings management via discretionary accruals and trade
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Table 13: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in April (Quarterly Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in April for the years 1993 through 1999. Data includes
3,492 firm-quarter observations of non-financial NYSE stocks. The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares
outstanding on April 8 for the years 1993 to 1999). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the fourth quarter, which are estimated from the
cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the fourth quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the stock
has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a merger dummy
variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one plus the
average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), dividend yield in the fourth
quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the March 9 to April 8. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, *
denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.0132
(-4.75***)

0.0115
(3.90***)

-0.0118
(-4.26***)

0.0122
(4.12***)

0.0118
(3.47***)

0.0109
(3.16***)
0.0208
(5.29***)

0.0165
(4.14***)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

0.0011
(0.99)

0.0071
(6.13***)

0.0011
(0.99)

0.0070
(6.08***)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0209
(14.34***)

0.0221
(15.16***)

0.0205
(14.09***)

0.0219
(15.02***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0031
(8.40***)

0.0033
(8.79***)

Firm Size

-0.0010
(-2.75***)
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-0.0008
(-2.32**)

Table 13-Continued
Dividend Yield

–

Stock Return

Merger Dummy

Dummy 93-98

No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

+

-0.0790
(-1.39)

-0.0517
(-0.89)

-0.0584
(-1.03)

-0.0367
(-0.64)

0.0136
(2.73***)

0.0161
(3.21***)

0.0143
(2.88***)

0.0169
(3.38***)

0.0109
(1.50)

0.0142
(1.95*)

0.0102
(1.41)

0.0137
(1.87*)

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

3,492
0.1053
32.61***

3,492
0.0891
27.28***

3,492
0.1094
33.98***

3,492
0.0910
27.89***
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on the information in total accruals and discretionary accruals. I argue that managers
of a firm tend to manage earnings more as the fiscal year-end is drawing near because
the overall earnings performance is revealed through the earnings per share by the
end of the fiscal year. Managers are under great pressure to meet or beat the financial
analyst forecast.

Moreover, managers may employ other earnings smoothing

mechanisms during the fiscal year.

Specifically, they may engage in risk

management by using financial derivatives to smooth earnings. Pincus and Rajgopal
(2002) suggest that managers first make decisions on implementing risk management
strategy by using financial derivatives and then, especially in the fourth fiscal quarter
reduce the residuals of volatility of earnings by trading off discretionary accruals
management and hedging using derivatives.

The sequential process of choice

between risk management and earnings management provide potential explanations
for the strong systematic relationship between discretionary accruals and relative
short interest in the third and fourth quarters.
6.2.3. Analysis of a Sample of Firm-year Observations
In addition to the analysis of quarterly data, I further investigate whether
there is an association between the level of relative short interest and annual accruals
(annual discretionary accruals). The relative short interest is measured as the short
interest in April (March 9 to April 8) following the fiscal year-end divided by the
number of shares outstanding on eighth of April after the fiscal year-end. The results
are reported in Table 14. The coefficient on discretionary accruals is 0.0071 and
statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on total accruals is 0.0263 and
significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the results using quarterly data, total
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accruals and discretionary accruals are significantly and positively associated with the
level of short interest, suggesting that short sellers see through earnings management
by targeting stocks with high levels of total accruals and discretionary accruals based
on the financial accounting information in the 10-K report. Additionally, the results
indicate a positive relationship between relative short interest and the Convertible
Dummy, Trading Volume, and Stock Returns variables.

Also, the findings suggest

that high dividend yield stocks have low levels of short selling activities.
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Table 14 Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and
Short Interest in April
(Annual Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interset in
April for the years 1993 through 1999. Data includes 5,118 firm-year observations of non-financial NYSE
stocks. The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares
outstanding on the April 8 for the years 1993 to 1999). The independent variables include discretionary
accruals in the fourth quarter, which are estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted
on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the fourth quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the
stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has
convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock
merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm
of one plus the average daily trading volume, dividend yield in the fourth quarter, year dummy variables,
the stock return, which is compounded from the March 9 to April 8. t-statistics are reported in the
parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

-0.0125
(-4.69***)

-0.0118
(-4.42***)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

-0.0009
(-0.81)

-0.0009
(-0.83)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0175
(12.01***)

0.0175
(12.05***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0035
(9.96***)

0.0037
(10.24***)

Div idend Yield

–

-0.0451
(-3.13***)

-0.0450
(-3.13***)

0.0128
(2.78***)

0.0143
(3.06***)

0.0111
(1.35)

0.0106
(1.29)

Suppressed

Suppressed

0.0071
(1.98**)
0.0263
(4.85***)

Stock Return

Merger Dummy

+

Dummy 93-98
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Table 14-Continued
No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

5,118
0.0656
28.62***
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5,118
0.0691
30.23***

7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Healy and Wahlen (1999) demonstrate that earnings management could be
motivated by regulation.

In the United States, financial service industries such as

banking, insurance and utilities are heavily regulated. The regulators monitor these
industries closely using accounting information.
closely in the utilities industry.

In past, rates have been regulated

Prior research in earnings management provides

evidence of earnings management in insurance, banking and utilities industries (e.g.
Paek 2001). However, there are few studies that provide information as to whether
investors and regulators of utilities detect earnings management. Among my sample
firms, 11.69% are electric, gas and sanitary services with a two-digit SIC code of 49.
In the following analysis, I restrict my sample to non-regulated firms. Tables 15 to
20 report the regression results of all models. The results for both quarterly data and
annual data are qualitatively similar to results reported in Tables 9 through 14. Both
discretionary accruals and total accruals are significantly and positively related to the
relative short interest for samples of firm-quarter and firm- year observations
respectively.
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Table 15 Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and
Short Interest Excluding Utilities
(Quarterly Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest.
Data includes 11,197 firm-quarter observations of non-financial, non-regulated NYSE stocks. The
dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares outstanding on
the 8th of the given month of the years 1992 to 1999). The independent variables include quarterly
discretionary accruals in four quarters estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on
a quarterly basis, quarterly total accruals, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the stock has a
traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt
or convertible preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced
in a given month and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one plus the average daily trading
volume, quarterly dividend yield, year dummy variables, the stock return, which is compounded from the
9th of the previous month to the 8th of the current month, and the CRSP value-weighted index return
compounded from the 9th of the previous month to the 8th of the current month. t-statistics are reported in
the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predi cted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

-0.0124
(-8.69***)

-0.0122
(-8.55***)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

0.0020
(3.36***)

0.0019
(3.22***)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0223
(29.09***)

0.0223
(29.07***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0026
(13.70***)

0.0027
(14.00***)

Dividend Yield

–

-0.0327
(-1.89*)

-0.0312
(-1.80*)

Stock Return

0.0044
(1.60)

0.0047
(1.71*)

Market Return

-0.0148
(-1.70*)

-0.0160
(-1.84**)

0.0131
(3.94***)

0.0128
(3.84***)

Merger Dummy

0.0101
(4.81***)
0.0115
(5.24***)

+
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Table 15-Continued
Dummy 93-98

No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

82

Suppressed

Suppressed

11,197
0.1204
110.50***

11,197
0.1208
110.85***

Table 16: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in June Excluding Utilities
(Quarterly Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in June for the years 1992 through 1998. Data includes
2,586 firm-quarter observations of non-financial, non-regulated NYSE stocks. The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the
number of shares outstanding on June 8th for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the first quarter, which are
estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the first quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set
to 1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a
merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of
one plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), dividend yield in
the first quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the May 9 to June 8 . t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **,
* denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.0121
(-4.20***)

0.0077
(2.50***)

-0.0122
(-4.22***)

0.0077
(2.49***)

-0.0072
(-0.56)

-0.0052
(-0.40)
0.0094
(0.67)

0.0064
(0.45)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

0.0013
(1.08)

0.0062
(5.16***)

0.0013
(1.09)

0.0062
(5.17***)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0214
(14.08***)

0.0222
(14.48***)

0.0214
(14.09***)

0.0222
(14.48***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0027
(7.10***)

0.0027
(7.10***)

Firm Size

-0.0007
(-1.82*)
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-0.0007
(-1.81*)

Table 16-Continued
Dividend Yield

–

Stock Return

Merger Dummy

Dummy 93-98

No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

+

-0.3524
(-3.82***)

-0.3168
(-3.37***)

-0.3530
(-3.82***)

-0.3173
(-3.38***)

-0.0031
(-0.49)

-0.0028
(-0.44)

-0.0034
(-0.53)

-0.0030
(-0.47)

0.0148
(2.85***)

0.0145
(2.76***)

0.0147
(2.82***)

0.0144
(2.74***)

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

2,586
0.1302
30.76***

2,586
0.1143
26.66***

2,586
0.1302
30.78***

2,586
0.1143
26.67***
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Table 17: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in September Excluding
Utilities (Quarterly Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in September for the years 1992 through 1998. Data
includes 2,576 firm-quarter observations of non-financial, non-regulated NYSE stocks. The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by
the number of shares outstanding on September 8 for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the second quarter,
which are estimated from cross-sectional modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the second quarter, an option dummy variable,
which is set to 1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible
preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the
natural logarithm of one plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred
stock), dividend yield in the second quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the August 9 to September 8. t-statistics are
reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.0094
(-3.24***)

0.0110
(3.51***)

-0.0094
(-3.24***)

0.0109
(3.49***)

0.0118
(2.01**)

0.0115
(1.95*)
0.0150
(2.32**)

0.0107
(1.65*)

Dis cretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

0.0032
(2.65***)

0.0086
(7.03***)

0.0032
(2.62***)

0.0085
(7.00***)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0211
(13.58***)

0.0215
(13.83***)

0.0212
(13.60***)

0.0216
(13.87***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0022
(5.53***)

0.0022
(5.67***)

Firm Size

-0.0013
(-3.50***)
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-0.0013
(-3.38***)

Table 17-Continued
Dividend Yield

–

Stock Return

Merger Dummy

Dummy 93-98

No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

+

-0.1262
(-1.22)

-0.0135
(-0.13)

-0.1157
(-1.12)

-0.0069
(-0.07)

0.0115
(1.83*)

0.0096
(1.52)

0.0118
(1.87*)

0.0096
(1.52)

0.0179
(2.41**)

0.0212
(2.84***)

0.0176
(2.37**)

0.0209
(2.80***)

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

2,576
0.1172
27.31***

2,576
0.1110
25.72***

2,576
0.1177
27.43***

2,576
0.1106
25.63***
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Table 18 Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in December Excluding
Utilities (Quarterly Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in December for the years 1992 through 1998. Data
includes 2,643 firm-quarter observations of non-financial, non-regulated NYSE stocks. The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by
the number of shares outstanding on December 8 for the years 1992 to 1998). The independent variables include the discretionary accruals in the third quarter,
which are estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the third quarter, an option dummy variable,
which is set to 1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible
preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the
natural logarithm of one plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred
stock), dividend yield in the third quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the November 9 to December 8. t-statistics are
reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.0104
(-3.71***)

0.0095
(3.18***)

-0.0098
(-3.49***)

0.0098
(3.28***)

0.0118
(3.11***)

0.0111
(2.89***)
0.0149
(3.48***)

0.0119
(2.75***)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

0.0035
(2.96***)

0.0085
(7.22***)

0.0034
(2.87***)

0.0084
(7.10***)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0239
(15.75***)

0.0245
(16.15***)

0.0238
(15.71***)

0.0245
(16.16***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0022
(5.83***)

0.0023
(6.00***)

Firm Size

-0.0011
(-3.02***)
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-0.0010
(-2.82***)

Table 18-Continued
Dividend Yield

–

Stock Return

Merger Dummy

Dummy 93-98

No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

+

-0.0114
(-0.63)

-0.0106
(-0.58)

-0.0116
(-0.64)

-0.0107
(-0.59)

-0.0069
(-1.38)

-0.0064
(-1.26)

-0.0071
(-1.41)

-0.0067
(-1.32)

0.0083
(1.14)

0.0083
(1.14)

0.0079
(1.09)

0.0081
(1.11)

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

2,643
0.1399
34.05***

2,643
0.1318
31.84

2,643
0.1407
34.26

2,643
0.1315
31.77

88

Table 19: Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and Short Interest in April Excluding
Utilities (Quarterly Data)
This table reports regression results for the association between earnings management and short interest in April for the years 1993 through 1999. Data includes
3,392 firm-quarter observations of non-financial, non-regulated NYSE stocks. The dependent variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the
number of shares outstanding on April 8 for the years 1993 to 1999). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the fourth quarter, which are
estimated from cross-sectional modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total accruals in the fourth quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to
1 if the stock has a traded option and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, a
merger dummy variable, wh ich indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of
one plus the average daily trading volume, the natural logarithm of firm size (market value of the equity plus the total debt and preferred stock), dividend yield in
the fourth quarter, year dummy variables, and the stock return, which is compounded from the March 9 to April 8. t -statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***,
**, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.0131
(-4.61***)

0.0119
(3.93***)

-0.0118
(-4.13***)

0.0126
(4.15***)

0.0131
(3.77***)

0.0124
(3.53***)
0.0218
(5.46***)

0.0176
(4.36***)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

0.0006
(0.54)

0.0068
(5.67***)

0.0006
(0.52)

0.0067
(5.60***)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0221
(14.70***)

0.0233
(15.42***)

0.0217
(14.46***)

0.0231
(15.30***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0032
(8.26***)

0.0033
(8.67***)

Firm Size

-0.0010
(-2.76***)
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-0.0009
(-2.31**)

Table 19-Continued
Dividend Yield

–

Stock Return

Merger Dummy

Dummy 93-98

No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

+

-0.0686
(-1.18)

-0.0335
(-0.57)

-0.0479
(-0.83)

-0.0183
(-0.31)

0.0138
(2.71***)

0.0161
(3.15***)

0.0146
(2.90***)

0.0171
(3.35***)

0.0102
(1.40)

0.0137
(1.85*)

0.0095
(1.30)

0.0131
(1.77*)

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

Suppressed

3,392
0.1082
32.65***

3,392
0.0922
27.50***

3,392
0.1123
33.99***

3,392
0.0940
28.05***
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Table 20 Regression Results for the Association between Earnings Management and
Short Interest in April Excluding Utilities
(Annual Data)
This table reports regression results for the determinants of short interest in April for the years 1993
through 1999. Data includes 4,383 firm-year observations of non-financial NYSE stocks. The dependent
variable is relative short interest (short interest divided by the number of shares outstanding on April 8 of
the years 1993 to 1999). The independent variables include discretionary accruals in the fourth quarter,
which are estimated from the cross-sectional Modified Jones model adapted on a quarterly basis, total
accruals in the fourth quarter, an option dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the stock has a traded option
and zero otherwise, a convertible dummy variable indicating if the stock has convertible debt or convertible
preferred stock, a merger dummy variable, which indicates that a stock merger is announced in the same
month as short interest and the firm is an acquirer, the natural logarithm of one plus the average daily
trading volume, dividend yield in the fourth quarter, year dummy variables, the stock return, which is
compounded from the March 9 to April 8. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * denotes
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Variables

Predicted Sign

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

-0.0133
(-4.35***)

-0.0125
(-4.11***)

Discretionary
Accruals

+

Total Accruals

+

Option Dummy

+

-0.0011
(-0.82)

-0.0011
(-0.88)

Convertible Dummy

+

0.0201
(12.31***)

0.0201
(12.36***)

Average Daily
Trading Volume

+

0.0036
(8.95***)

0.0037
(9.24***)

Dividend Yield

-0.0526
(-3.14***)

-0.0515
(-3.08***)

Stock Return

0.0125
(2.49***)

0.0139
(2.76***)

0.0088
(0.99)

0.0082
(0.92)

Suppressed

Suppressed

Merger Dummy

0.0068
(1.79**)
0.0277
(4.75***)

+

Dummy 93-98
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Table 20-Continued
No of Observations
Adjusted R-square
F Statistic

4,383
0.0692
26.07***

92

4,383
0.0733
27.67***

8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides empirical evidence that sophisticated speculative short
sellers exploit the market mispricing of quarterly total accruals and discretionary
accruals. The results suggest that speculative short sellers target stocks with high
accruals that are overvalued by the capital market. More importantly, speculative
short sellers are sophisticated enough to distinguish the discretionary component of
accruals from the non-discretionary component of accruals. They establish short
positions in stocks with high income- increasing discretionary accruals based on the
quarterly financial accounting report and the 10-K report. Prior research documents
that earnings management causes stock mispricing in the capital market and thus the
invested capital is not allocated efficiently. Recent studies suggest that auditors and
financial analysts do not see through earnings management. This study contributes to
the existing literature on earnings management by investigating whether speculative
short sellers can detect earnings management. The results suggest that short sellers
can detect earnings management by trading on the information in accruals and
discretionary accruals disclosed in financial reporting.
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